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The Race to the Base

Author

Listed:
  • Bernhardt, Dan

    (Department ofEconomics, University of Illinois and University of Warwick)

  • Buisseret, Peter

    (Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago)

  • Hidir, Sinem

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

We study multi-district legislative elections between two office-seeking parties when the election pits a relatively strong party against a weaker party ; when each party faces uncertainty about how voter preferences will evolve during the campaign; and, when each party cares not only about winning a majority, but also about its share of seats in the event that it holds majority or minority status. When the initial imbalance favoring one party is small, each party targets the median voter in the median district, in pursuit of a majority. When the imbalance is moderate, the advantaged party continues to hold the centre-ground, but the disadvantaged party retreats to target its core supporters; it does so to fortify its minority share of seats in the likely event that it fails to secure a majority. Finally, when the imbalance is large, the advantaged party advances toward its opponent, raiding its moderate supporters in pursuit of an outsized majority.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhardt, Dan & Buisseret, Peter & Hidir, Sinem, 2018. "The Race to the Base," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1180, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1180
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Alpino, Matteo & Asatryan, Zareh & Blesse, Sebastian & Wehrhöfer, Nils, 2022. "Austerity and distributional policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 112-127.
    3. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Ideological Consistency and Valence," Working Papers 1383, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Schmutz, Benoît & Verdugo, Gregory, 2023. "Do elections affect immigration? Evidence from French municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    5. Felix Bierbrauer & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2021. "Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home," CESifo Working Paper Series 8954, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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