Interest Groups And Economic Policy: Explaining The Pattern Of Protection In The Brazilian Agricultural Sector
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00042.x
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Magreta, Ruth & Magombo, Tennyson & Zingore, Shamie, 2010. "When the Weak Win: Role of Farmer Groups in Influencing Agricultural Policy Outcome; a Case of Nkhate Irrigation Scheme in Malawi," 2010 AAAE Third Conference/AEASA 48th Conference, September 19-23, 2010, Cape Town, South Africa 97043, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE).
- Steven M. Helfand & Gervásio Castro de Rezende, 2004. "The Impact of Sector‐Specific and Economy‐Wide Policy Reforms on the Agricultural Sector in Brazil: 1980–98," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(2), pages 194-212, April.
- Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro & Facchini, Giovanni, 2005.
"Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 432-446, May.
- Ferreira, Pedro Cavalcanti & Facchini, Giovanni, 2004. "Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: evidence from Brazil," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 531, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
- Giovanni Facchini; Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira, 2004. "Trade Liberalization and Industrial Concentration:Evidence from Brazil," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 126, Econometric Society.
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