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Interest Groups And Economic Policy: Explaining The Pattern Of Protection In The Brazilian Agricultural Sector

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  • SM Helfand

Abstract

This article examines the determinants of the pattern of protection across products in the Brazilian agricultural sector from 1969 to 1989. Three key determinants of policy are explored: interest group pressure, government objectives, and structural change associated with economic crisis and a change in political regime. The principal agricultural policies are analyzed, and nominal protection coefficients (NPCs) and producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) are calculated. When NPCs are used as the dependent variable, econometric results indicate that interest group characteristics such as group size were an important determinant of the pattern of protection. With PSEs, government efforts to raise tax revenues, generate foreign exchange, and control inflation played a more significant role. The results of this paper suggest that future studies of the political economy of protection should pay more attention to the specification of the dependent variable because the conclusions can depend crucially on this choice.

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  • SM Helfand, 2000. "Interest Groups And Economic Policy: Explaining The Pattern Of Protection In The Brazilian Agricultural Sector," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(4), pages 462-476, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:18:y:2000:i:4:p:462-476
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00042.x
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    1. Pinhas Zusman & Amotz Amiad, 1977. "A Quantitative Investigation of a Political Economy—The Israeli Dairy Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 59(1), pages 88-98.
    2. Beghin, John C. & Karp, Larry S., 1991. "Estimation of price policies in Senegal An empirical test of cooperative game theory," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 49-67, January.
    3. Graham, Douglas H & Gauthier, Howard & de Barros, Jose Roberto Mendonca, 1987. "Thirty Years of Agricultural Growth in Brazil: Crop Performance, Regional Profile, and Recent Policy Review," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 1-34, October.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro & Facchini, Giovanni, 2005. "Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 432-446, May.
    2. Magreta, Ruth & Magombo, Tennyson & Zingore, Shamie, 2010. "When the Weak Win: Role of Farmer Groups in Influencing Agricultural Policy Outcome; a Case of Nkhate Irrigation Scheme in Malawi," 2010 AAAE Third Conference/AEASA 48th Conference, September 19-23, 2010, Cape Town, South Africa 97043, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE).
    3. Steven M. Helfand & Gervásio Castro de Rezende, 2004. "The Impact of Sector‐Specific and Economy‐Wide Policy Reforms on the Agricultural Sector in Brazil: 1980–98," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(2), pages 194-212, April.

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