A Note On The Property Rights Theory And The Ex Ante Value Of Information
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Cited by:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021.
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- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Karel Zeman, 2018. "Analýza teorie vlastnických práv [Theory of Ownership Rights Analysis]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(1), pages 99-115.
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