IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/buecrs/v60y2008i1p1-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Middlemen And The Adverse Selection Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Timo Vesala

Abstract

We demonstrate that the coexistence of an uncoordinated search market and a middleman market may alleviate adverse selection in the trade of goods of different quality. Inability to conduct trade penalizes sellers of low‐quality goods disproportionately, encouraging them to trade via middlemen. A semi‐separating equilibrium exists when a sufficient number of sellers of low‐quality goods choose the middleman market to allow high‐quality goods to be successfully traded in the search market. The result may explain why a search market can survive alongside a coordinated market, a phenomenon characteristic, for example, of markets for used cars, housing and labour.

Suggested Citation

  • Timo Vesala, 2008. "Middlemen And The Adverse Selection Problem," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 1-11, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:60:y:2008:i:1:p:1-11
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2007.00267.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2007.00267.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2007.00267.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2002. "Dynamic Trading in a Durable Good Market with Asymmetric Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 257-282, February.
    2. Gehrig, Thomas, 1993. "Intermediation in Search Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, Spring.
    3. Hall, Robert E., 1979. "A theory of the natural unemployment rate and the duration of employment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 153-169, April.
    4. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
    5. Genesove, David, 1993. "Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 644-665, August.
    6. Max R. Blouin, 2003. "Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 245-262, September.
    7. Max Blouin, 2001. "Equilibrium in a Decentralized Market with Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 128, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Mar 2001.
    8. Gerard R. Butters, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 465-491.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    10. Gary Biglaiser, 1993. "Middlemen as Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 212-223, Summer.
    11. Li, Yiting, 1998. "Middlemen and private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 131-159, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tara Mitchell, 2014. "Is Knowledge Power? Competition and Information in Agricultural Markets," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp456, IIIS.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Klaus Kultti & Eeva Mauring & Juuso Vanhala & Timo Vesala, 2015. "Adverse Selection In Dynamic Matching Markets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 115-133, April.
    2. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2016. "Dynamic adverse selection and the supply size," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 233-242.
    3. Makoto Watanabe, 2018. "Middle Men: The Visible Market-Makers," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 156-170, June.
    4. Camargo, Braz & Lester, Benjamin, 2014. "Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 534-568.
    5. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 2016. "Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    6. Gary Biglaiser & Fei Li & Charles Murry & Yiyi Zhou, 2020. "Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 905-933, September.
    7. Yuet-Yee Wong & Randall Wright, 2011. "Buyers, sellers and middlemen: variations in search theory," Working Papers 691, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    8. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978.
    9. Randall Wright & Yuet‐Yee Wong, 2014. "Buyers, Sellers, And Middlemen: Variations On Search‐Theoretic Themes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 375-397, May.
    10. Palazzo, Francesco, 2017. "Search costs and the severity of adverse selection," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 171-197.
    11. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    12. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Anagol, Santosh, 2017. "Adverse selection in asset markets: Theory and evidence from the Indian market for cows," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 58-72.
    14. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    15. Arya, Anil & Löffler, Clemens & Mittendorf, Brian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2015. "The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(2), pages 393-400.
    16. Lars Boerner & Daniel Quint, 2023. "Medieval Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(1), pages 23-56, February.
    17. Xianwen Shi & Aloysius Siow, 2014. "Information externalities and intermediaries in frictional search markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1131-1152, November.
    18. Corentin Curchod, 2008. "Stratégies d’intermédiation et dynamiques de chaînes de valeur:leçons tirées de l’intermédiation électronique," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(2), pages 7-28, June.
    19. Kennes, John & le Maire, Daniel & Roelsgaard, Sebastian T., 2020. "Equivalence of canonical matching models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 169-182.
    20. Erik Durbin, 2000. "McDonald's or the Michelin Guide? Revealing Quality Through Private-Sector Certification," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1097, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:60:y:2008:i:1:p:1-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0307-3378 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.