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Propertyless in Peru, Even with a Government Land Title

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  • Carrie B. Kerekes
  • Claudia R. Williamson

Abstract

This article investigates the ability and process of government land titling as a method to achieve secure property rights institutions. Specifically, we analyze the impact of government land titling in rural Peru. Our findings suggest that land titling does not achieve the positive benefits associated with secure property, such as access to credit. We also find that individuals prefer private enforcement methods of securing property to public means. This suggests that government land titling is not always a channel through which countries can achieve secure property rights institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Carrie B. Kerekes & Claudia R. Williamson, 2010. "Propertyless in Peru, Even with a Government Land Title," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 1011-1033, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:69:y:2010:i:3:p:1011-1033
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2010.00734.x
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    Cited by:

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    2. Azadi, Hossein & Vanhaute, Eric & Janečková, Kristina & Sklenička, Petr & Teklemariam, Dereje & Feng, Lei & Witlox, Frank, 2020. "Evolution of land distribution in the context of development theories," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    3. Cai, Meina & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer, 2020. "The politics of land property rights," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 151-167, April.
    4. Diana W. Thomas & Michael Clark & Humberto Alba Castillo & Kevin D. Gomez, 2020. "The Law of the Taxi: Informal Property Rights Institutions in the Uninhibited State," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Fall 2020), pages 49-62.
    5. Benito Arruñada, 2017. "How to Make Land Titling more Rational," Working Papers 983, Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Leeson, Peter T. & Harris, Colin, 2018. "Wealth-destroying private property rights," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-9.
    7. van der Zon, Marieke & de Jong, Wil & Arts, Bas, 2023. "Community enforcement and tenure security: A fuzzy-set qualitative Comparative analysis of twelve community forest management initiatives in the Peruvian Amazon," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    8. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, January.
    9. Cai,Yongyang & Selod,Harris & Steinbuks,Jevgenijs, 2015. "Urbanization and property rights," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7486, The World Bank.
    10. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2015. "Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 287-305, March.
    11. Franklin Obeng-Odoom, 2016. "Understanding Land Reform in Ghana," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 48(4), pages 661-680, December.
    12. Patricia Clarke Annez & Bijal Bhatt & Bimal Patel, 2017. "What Getting Legal Land Title Really Means," Review of Market Integration, India Development Foundation, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-26, April.
    13. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019. "The political economy of legal titling," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 251-268, September.
    14. Perry Ferrell, 2019. "Titles for me but not for thee: transitional gains trap of property rights extension in Colombia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 95-114, January.

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