IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajecsc/v63y2004i4p921-938.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

When Did Equality Become a Noneconomic Objective?

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Persky

Abstract

. This brief survey begins with a suggested procedure for determining whether a given economist viewed a particular goal as an economic or noneconomic objective. Roughly speaking, the approach rests on whether that economist attempted a serious analysis of the tradeoffs between the goal in question and some measure of value. In this view, noneconomic objectives, for any school, include all those objectives that, while recognized as potentially legitimate, are not analyzed in terms of commensurable value measures. Three points to notice about the definition: (1) For any economist, economic objectives should be distinguished from a class of intermediate goods valued largely for their predicted positive impact on production; (2) Some objectives may be altogether dismissed by a school, either as beyond the expertise of economic analysis or as downright harmful; (3) Simply acknowledging the existence of a “cost” to achieving a goal leaves that goal as noneconomic since no attempt at valuation has been made. The paper goes on to sketch three viewpoints toward income equality—that of the classical school as summarized in the work of J. S. Mill, that of the early neoclassicists as represented by Marshall and Pigou, and that of the “new welfare economics” as developed by Kaldor and Hicks. The classical economists valued the relief of poverty, but explicitly attacked anything but the most basic redistributional efforts because of expected dire effects on production. The early neoclassicists built equality implicitly into a utilitarian social welfare function. The “new welfare economics” doubted economists’ ability to assess the value of equality, although perhaps not their ability to measure its opportunity cost. Thus the basic argument: both the classicists and the early neoclassicists saw equality as an economic objective, while the new welfare economics was largely built on denying this status to equality.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Persky, 2004. "When Did Equality Become a Noneconomic Objective?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 921-938, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:63:y:2004:i:4:p:921-938
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00324.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00324.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00324.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:econom:v:50:y:1983:i:197:p:3-17 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Julius Margolis, 1970. "The Analysis of Public Output," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number marg70-1.
    3. J. N. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, 1969. "Optimal Intervention to Achieve Non-Economic Objectives," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 36(1), pages 27-38.
    4. John Bonner, 1995. "Economic Efficiency And Social Justice," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 543.
    5. Cooter, Robert & Rappoport, Peter, 1984. "Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 507-530, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Sanchez-Martinez & Philip Davis, 2014. "A review of the economic theories of poverty," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 435, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    2. Andrea Maneschi, 2004. "Noneconomic Objectives in the History of Economic Thought," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 911-920, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francesco Aiello, 2002. "Ranking Production Subsidies and Import Tariffs under Different Scenarios," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(11), pages 715-720.
    2. Carlo Borzaga & Silvia Sacchetti, 2015. "Why Social Enterprises Are Asking to Be Multi-stakeholder and Deliberative: An Explanation around the Costs of Exclusion," Euricse Working Papers 1575, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    3. Gabriel Leite Mota, 2022. "Unsatisfying ordinalism: The breach through which happiness (re)entered economics," Regional Science Policy & Practice, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 513-528, June.
    4. Rogers Ahlbrandt, 1973. "Efficiency in the provision of fire services," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, September.
    5. Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
    6. Elizabeth Stanton, 2007. "The Human Development Index: A History," Working Papers wp127, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    7. Papageorgiou, Yorgos Y. & Pines, David, 2000. "Externalities, Indivisibility, Nonreplicability, and Agglomeration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 509-535, November.
    8. Kuehn, Daniel, 2021. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and the “Radically Irresponsible” One Person, One Vote Decisions," OSF Preprints zetq4, Center for Open Science.
    9. Antoinette Baujard, 2016. "Welfare economics," Chapters, in: Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz D. Kurz (ed.), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume III, chapter 42, pages 611-624, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Krishna, Pravin & Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1997. "Necessarily welfare-enhancing customs unions with industrialization constraints: The Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati conjecture," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 441-446, December.
    11. David Colander, 2005. "From Muddling Through to the Economics of Control: Views of Applied Policy from J. N. Keynes to Abba Lerner," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 37(5), pages 277-291, Supplemen.
    12. repec:sae:envval:v:21:y:2012:i:4:p:499-524 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Karoly Fazekas & Jeno Koltay (ed.), 2002. "The Hungarian Labour Market 2002," The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbooks, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 2002, December.
    14. Gabriel Leite Mota, 2007. "Why Should Happiness Have a Role in Welfare Economics? Happiness versus Orthodoxy and Capabilities," FEP Working Papers 253, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    15. Ackerman, Frank & Stanton, Elizabeth A. & Bueno, Ramón, 2013. "CRED: A new model of climate and development," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 166-176.
    16. C.D. Foster, 1972. "Public Finance Aspects of National Settlement Patterns," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 9(1), pages 79-97, February.
    17. Donna Driscoll & Dennis Halcoussis & Anton D. Lowenberg, 2010. "Explaining Local Growth-Management Policies: The Role of Public Goods," American Journal of Economics and Business Administration, Science Publications, vol. 2(1), pages 45-55, March.
    18. Panagariya, Arvind, 1990. "How should tariffs be structured?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 353, The World Bank.
    19. Erika López Pontón, 2008. "Un criterio de eficiencia para la concepción y evaluación de las políticas públicas," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 10(18), pages 149-178, January-J.
    20. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
    21. Lars Feld, 2014. "James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-252, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:63:y:2004:i:4:p:921-938. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0002-9246 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.