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Eyes on the prize: CEO and director retirement preferences and acquisitions

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  • Victoria Clout
  • Samir Ghannam
  • Anna Loyeung
  • Jin Sug Yang

Abstract

We examine whether the age of CEOs and independent directors impacts the likelihood of receiving a successful takeover offer. First, we replicate and confirm the results of Jenter and Lewellen and find that retirement age CEOs (age 64–66) are more likely to receive successful takeover offers. Second, we extend their study by investigating the retirement preferences of independent directors. We find that the likelihood of receiving a successful takeover offer increases when a higher proportion of independent directors are at retirement age. This finding suggests that independent directors have similar retirement preferences to CEOs.

Suggested Citation

  • Victoria Clout & Samir Ghannam & Anna Loyeung & Jin Sug Yang, 2021. "Eyes on the prize: CEO and director retirement preferences and acquisitions," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(S1), pages 1345-1361, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:61:y:2021:i:s1:p:1345-1361
    DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12629
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    References listed on IDEAS

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