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I Feel Your Pain: The Effect of Regulator as a Minority Shareholder on Merger and Acquisition Performance

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  • Xin Wang
  • Jiacai Xiong
  • Caiyue Ouyang
  • Feida Zhang

Abstract

We examine the effect of a regulator‐led advocate for minority shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance in China. In recent years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission established the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), which began its ownership of 100 shares of public firms in 2016. The CSISC advocates for the interests of minority shareholders proactively. Focusing on abnormal stock returns in M&A announcements, we find that acquirers that have the CSISC as a shareholder (CSISC acquirers) exhibit higher positive abnormal stock returns than non‐CSISC acquirers. Cross‐sectional analysis suggests that the core results are mainly driven by firms with severe agency problems and weak external/internal monitoring, and those not controlled by the state. In addition, we find that CSISC acquirers have better long‐term performance and encounter more M&A failures than non‐CSISC acquirers. Our findings indicate that although the CSISC only holds 100 shares of listed companies, it plays an effective role in monitoring and driving firms to make appropriate M&A decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin Wang & Jiacai Xiong & Caiyue Ouyang & Feida Zhang, 2023. "I Feel Your Pain: The Effect of Regulator as a Minority Shareholder on Merger and Acquisition Performance," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(1), pages 437-465, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:59:y:2023:i:1:p:437-465
    DOI: 10.1111/abac.12271
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