Financial Statements Insurance
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Cited by:
- Adi Masli & Matthew G. Sherwood & Rajendra P. Srivastava, 2018. "Attributes and Structure of an Effective Board of Directors: A Theoretical Investigation," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 54(4), pages 485-523, December.
- Taslima Akther & Xu Fengju & Md Ziaul Haque, 2019. "An Investigation ofAudit Expectation Gap in Bangladesh," Journal of Business, LAR Center Press, vol. 4(2), pages 1-11, February.
- Hwang, Seokyoun & Sarath, Bharat & Han, Seung-youb, 2022. "Auditor independence: The effect of auditors’ quality control efforts and corporate governance," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
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