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Application of Weisbord's Organizational Diagnosis Model: A Case of Pakistan Banking Industry

Author

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  • Afia Saleem

    (Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar)

  • Usman Ghani

    (Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar)

Abstract

Today’s organizations are facing multiple challenges and threats to manage and maintain effectiveness, efficiency, synergy, dynamic business environment, increased competition and customer demands. The prime confront is to preserve correspondence among organizational dimensions like technology, strategy, culture and processes. This research attempts to analyze the problems of the leading banks’ branch network in Pakistan (Peshawar Region) by the application of the Preziosi’s questionnaire, reflecting the dimensions presented by the organizational diagnosis model of Weisbord. The results of the study diagnosed that the organizations under the research study had problems in rewards whereas the rest of the dimensions indicated no problem for the organizations. A significant contribution of the study remains the utility of weisbord’s organizational diagnosis model for the problem diagnosis in the modern organizations on the basis of which organizations can not only improve their performance but can also ensure better customer’s satisfaction . Implications for the future research in the field of organizational diagnosis have been suggested in the end

Suggested Citation

  • Afia Saleem & Usman Ghani, 2013. "Application of Weisbord's Organizational Diagnosis Model: A Case of Pakistan Banking Industry," Business & Economic Review, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-11, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bec:imsber:v:5:y:2013:i:1:p:1-11
    DOI: dx.doi.org/10.22547/BER/5.1.1
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    File URL: http://imsciences.edu.pk/files/journals/Vol.%205%20No.%201.%20April%202013/Paper%20(1).pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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