IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bcp/journl/v6y2022i11p665-674.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Executive-Legislative Conflicts and The Quest for Accountability in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy: A Case of the 8th National Assembly

Author

Listed:
  • O. Celestine Jombo, PhD

    (Department of Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University Akungba Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria)

Abstract

This paper examines the seemingly intractable tensions and frictions between the executive and legislative branches in Nigeria. Specifically, it interrogates the intricate political and personality issues that surrounded the recurring tension and open confrontation between the presidency and the 8th National Assembly between 2015 and 2019. Using a combination of both descriptive and analytical methods and through a review of the extant literature, the paper reaffirmed and established the primacy of the legislature as an institution of accountability under the Nigeria’s presidential system. The paper discovered that persistent conflicts and contradictions between the executive and legislative actors in Nigeria have made effective budget formulation and implementation a difficult task with far-reaching political and socio-economic consequences for the nation’s body politic. The rifts breed suspicion and hostility between the two branches of government, creates division in the legislature, brings distraction to the governance process and, ultimately, propels the resort to the culture of impunity and total disregard to the rule of law by the governing elites. The paper concludes that the constitutional provisions defining the interface between the executive and legislative branches are adequate to engender stable and accountable government. Nevertheless, the political actors across the executive-legislative divide must be ready to embrace the dictates of separation of powers as enshrined in the 1999 constitution, abide by the rules of democratic game, and collaborate to work for the interests of the Nigerian people.

Suggested Citation

  • O. Celestine Jombo, PhD, 2022. "Executive-Legislative Conflicts and The Quest for Accountability in Nigeria’s Presidential Democracy: A Case of the 8th National Assembly," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 6(11), pages 665-674, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bcp:journl:v:6:y:2022:i:11:p:665-674
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-6-issue-11/665-674.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.rsisinternational.org/virtual-library/papers/executive-legislative-conflicts-and-the-quest-for-accountability-in-nigerias-presidential-democracy-a-case-of-the-8th-national-assembly/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    2. Celestine Ojo Jombo & Omololu Fagbadebo, 2019. "Integrity Deficit as an Impediment to Effective Legislative Oversight in Nigeria," Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, in: Omololu Fagbadebo & Fayth Ruffin (ed.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa, pages 123-142, Springer.
    3. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:125-141 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Rockey, James, 2012. "Reconsidering the fiscal effects of constitutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 313-323.
    3. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," Working Papers 189, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Buchanan, James M. & Yoon, Yong J., 2004. "Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 73-90, March.
    7. Feltenstein, Andrew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2005. "International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 73-96, September.
    8. Jorge Streb & Gustavo Torrens, 2013. "Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 703-722, September.
    9. Takanori Adachi & Yoichi Hizen, 2014. "Political Accountability, Electoral Control and Media Bias," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 316-343, September.
    10. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political economy aspects of fuel subsidies : a conceptual framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6392, The World Bank.
    11. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
    12. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress," Working Papers 2072/151813, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    13. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    14. Gersbach, Hans & Jackson, Matthew O. & Muller, Philippe & Tejada, Oriol, 2023. "Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A dynamic perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    15. Lucifora, Claudio & Moriconi, Simone, 2015. "Political instability and labour market institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 201-221.
    16. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    17. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2016. "A Theory of Political Entrenchment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 1238-1263, June.
    18. Jorge M. Streb & Daniel Lema & Gustavo Torrens, 2009. "Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles: Cross‐Country Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 426-447, August.
    19. Sebastiano Bavetta & Fabio Padovano, 2000. "A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 5-25, March.
    20. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Ouattara, Bazoumanna & Strobl, Eric, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," MPRA Paper 3158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2007.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bcp:journl:v:6:y:2022:i:11:p:665-674. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dr. Pawan Verma (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.