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Corporatism – A New Type of Socioeconomic System

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  • Nikolai Naidenov

Abstract

Some elements of the socioeconomic system called Corporatism are outlined and analyzed in this paper. In this system a new type of property on the means of production comes into being, and a considerable part of the functions executed respectively by the individual or by the state in the alternative systems capitalism and socialism, pass over to the corporation. This leads to changes in the character of competition, the system of social protection, the aims of the social production, the manifestation of the freedom of the individual. The fundamental characteristics of corporatism are traced out on three different levels - intercompany (meso), intracompany (micro) and national (macro) level. The relations between companies are institutionalized predominantly under the form of multisector amalgamations of joint stock companies (MSAJSC), which are namely considered as a new type of property on the means of production. The basic peculiarities of the corporatistic company can be summarized in the integration of management and workers and in the independence of the company leaders from the control of capital. The influence of the state on corporations is indirect and is based on the "mutual understanding", built up in the process of continuous interaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolai Naidenov, 2002. "Corporatism – A New Type of Socioeconomic System," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 5, pages 27-43.
    • Handle: RePEc:bas:econth:y:2002:i:5:p:27-43
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P47 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Performance and Prospects
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East

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