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A Risk-Income Method Of Royalty Rate Calculation In Case Of Franchising

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan Kotliarov

    (State University – Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg Branch)

Abstract

The present article contains a description of a new method of royalty calculation based on analysis of risk decrease generated by franchisor’s intellectual assets transmitted to franchisees.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Kotliarov, 2011. "A Risk-Income Method Of Royalty Rate Calculation In Case Of Franchising," Economic Thought and Practice, Department of Economics and Business, University of Dubrovnik, vol. 20(1), pages 161-170, june.
    • Handle: RePEc:avo:emipdu:v:20:y:2011:i:1:p:161-170
    as

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    File URL: https://hrcak.srce.hr/clanak/103925
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2011. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775892, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    royalty; royalty rate; franchising;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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