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Deceptive evidence: The experience of product market definition for the purpose of competition law enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Andrey E. Shastitko

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
    Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia)

  • Olga A. Markova

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
    Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia)

  • Anton N. Morozov

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
    Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Could identical goods sold by the same company on the same territory and at the same time be attributed to different product markets? In our paper we take a closer look at the case of the wrought-steel wheel industry, which became the subject of an antitrust investigation initiated by the FAS Russia in 2020. During a shortage, one of the largest wrought-steel wheel producers sold small batches of wheels to minor buyers at relatively high prices compared to the industry average. FAS Russia assumed this price difference to be evidence for abuse of market power. In contrast to FAS Russia's conclusions, we suggest that wrought-steel wheels sold to major and minor buyers constitute at least two separate markets. To test this hypothesis, we define a relevant product market employing a price correlation analysis. To conduct robustness check we also provide a stationarity test on the log price ratio and a cointegration test which fall within the results of correlation analysis. As consumers actually did engage in side transactions, the revealed price difference is not related to price discrimination. We explain this price difference using the new institutional economics, assuming that goods sold to a large buyer do possess special transaction characteristics which do not meet the characteristics of the batches consumed by minor buyers. Another explanation is differences in bargaining power between large and minor buyers. Our result shows that there can be identified at least two wrought-steel wheel product markets: one with Russian Railways as the main buyer and the second one with smaller undertakings.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey E. Shastitko & Olga A. Markova & Anton N. Morozov, 2022. "Deceptive evidence: The experience of product market definition for the purpose of competition law enforcement," Russian Journal of Economics, ARPHA Platform, vol. 8(3), pages 255-275, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:arh:jrujec:v:8:y:2022:i:3:p:255-275
    DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.82144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Davis & Eliana Garcés, 2009. "Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9078.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition policy market borders wrought-steel wheels quantitative price tests.;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics

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