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Instytucje a rozwój gospodarczy: badania Darona Acemoglu, Simona Johnsona i Jamesa Robinsona

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  • Piotr Arak

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  • Piotr Arak, 2024. "Instytucje a rozwój gospodarczy: badania Darona Acemoglu, Simona Johnsona i Jamesa Robinsona," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 4, pages 507-522.
    • Handle: RePEc:aoq:ekonom:y:2024:i:4:p:507-522
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rozwój gospodarczy; ekonomia polityczna; reżimy instytucjonalne; instytucje włączające; instytucje wykluczające;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B12 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
    • B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • O50 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - General

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