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Wybrane uwarunkowania stosowania instrumentu umorzenia lub konwersji długu (bail-in)

Author

Listed:
  • Marcin Borsuk
  • Kamil Klupa

Abstract

Po globalnym kryzysie finansowym dokonano gruntownej reformy ram prawnych działalności bankowej, której celem była bardziej efektywna ochrona stabilności systemu finansowego. Nowe rozwiązania zdefiniowano m.in. w ramach procesu naprawy oraz restrukturyzacji i uporządkowanej likwidacji (ang. recovery and resolution). Spośród wielu nowych uprawnień organów publicznych tym najdalej idącym jest możliwość umorzenia lub konwersji instrumentów dłużnych (ang. bail-in) w sytuacji, gdy bank znajdzie się na progu upadłości lub będzie zagrożony upadłością. Mechanizm bail-in ze względu na swój samodzielny potencjał restrukturyzacyjny miał w zamyśle jego twórców stać się jednym z podstawowych instrumentów zarządzania kryzysowego. Z czasem ujawniły się jednak specyficzne wyzwania o charakterze polityczno-społecznym i w wymiarze stabilności finansowej, które mogą tłumaczyć dotychczasową niską skłonność organów publicznych do stosowania instrumentu bail-in. W artykule podjęto próbę zweryfikowania występowania specyficznych czynników wpływających na dotychczasową niską skłonność do stosowania mechanizmu bail-in. W pierwszej kolejności opisano uwarunkowania polityczno-społeczne, których oddziaływanie objawia się przede wszystkim ze względu na istotny zakres dyskrecjonalności przyznanej organom publicznym w ramach procesu resolution. Mając na uwadze, że administracyjne umorzenie instrumentów dłużnych lub kapitałowych może wpływać na zachowania uczestników rynków finansowych, analizie poddano również występowanie efektu zarażania poprzez kanał rynkowy, ponieważ ewentualność wystąpienia napięć na rynku finansowym może również oddziaływać na proces decyzyjny właściwych organów.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Borsuk & Kamil Klupa, 2021. "Wybrane uwarunkowania stosowania instrumentu umorzenia lub konwersji długu (bail-in)," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 3, pages 346-374.
    • Handle: RePEc:aoq:ekonom:y:2021:i:3:p:346-374
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, 2015. "Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 3-29.
    2. Laurent Clerc & Alberto Giovannini & Sam Langfield & Tuomas Peltonen & Richard Portes & Martin Scheicher, 2016. "Indirect contagion: the policy problem," ESRB Occasional Paper Series 09, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. Clerc, Laurent & Giovannini, Alberto & Langfield, Sam & Peltonen, Tuomas A. & Portes, Richard & Scheicher, Martin, 2016. "Indirect contagion: the policy problem," ESRB Occasional Paper Series 9, European Systemic Risk Board.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    stabilność finansowa; restrukturyzacja; uporządkowana likwidacja; regulacje bankowe; bail-in; umorzenie; konwersja;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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