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Completing the banking union: Economic requirements and legal conditions

Author

Listed:
  • Beck, Thorsten
  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter
  • Martin, Philippe J.
  • Mayer, Franz C.
  • Pisani-Ferry, Jean
  • Tröger, Tobias
  • Weder, Beatrice
  • Véron, Nicolas
  • Zettelmeyer, Jeromin

Abstract

The great financial crisis and the euro area crisis led to a substantial reform of financial safety nets across Europe and - critically - to the introduction of supranational elements. Specifically, a supranational supervisor was established for the euro area, with discrete arrangements for supervisory competences and tasks depending on the systemic relevance of supervised credit institutions. A resolution mechanism was created to allow the frictionless resolution of large financial institutions. This resolution mechanism has been now complemented with a funding instrument. While much more progress has been achieved than most observers could imagine 12 years ago, the banking union remains unfinished with important gaps and deficiencies. The experience over the past years, especially in the area of crisis management and resolution, has provided impetus for reform discussions, as reflected most lately in the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022.

Suggested Citation

  • Beck, Thorsten & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Martin, Philippe J. & Mayer, Franz C. & Pisani-Ferry, Jean & Tröger, Tobias & Weder, Beatrice & Véron, Nicolas & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2022. "Completing the banking union: Economic requirements and legal conditions," SAFE White Paper Series 93, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:93
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2013. "Deposit insurance suitable for Europe: Proposal for a three-stage deposit guarantee scheme with limited European liability," SAFE Policy Letters 8, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Götz, Martin & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Tröger, Tobias, 2017. "Five years after the Liikanen Report: What have we learned?," SAFE White Paper Series 50, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, 2015. "Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 3-29.
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    1. Cœuré, Benoît & König, Elke & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Huizinga, Harry & Schlegel, Jonas, 2024. "Winners and losers in bank resolution: Recent examples and a modest reform proposal," SAFE White Paper Series 106, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.

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    Keywords

    Banking Union; Legal Reforms;

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