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Institutions, Policies And Efficiency In Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Pavel Stoynov

    (Sofia University “St. Klimet Ohridski” Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

There are cases where the governments may not always serve the public interest. The implication seems to be that governments can help out but only if properly constrained. The impact of these ideas on monetary policy led to creation of Central banks. As far as fiscal policymaking is concerned, the evolution has been slower. It would seem that we are now ready to move to the next step, replacing rules with adequate incentives backed by institutions - fiscal policy committees.

Suggested Citation

  • Pavel Stoynov, 2007. "Institutions, Policies And Efficiency In Economies," Revista Tinerilor Economisti (The Young Economists Journal), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(8), pages 7-10, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aio:rteyej:v:1:y:2007:i:8:p:7-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wyplosz, Charles, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191, pages 64-78, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    policies; institutions; rules.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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