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Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Aadland, David
  • Koplin, Van

Abstract

Successful formation and long-term stability of cooperative ventures is often linked to the perceived fairness of the cost and resource allocations that these ventures employ. Indeed, the lack of a consensus over what basis should be used for gauging equitable allocation can undermine the prospects for collaboration. We use irrigation cost sharing as a context for examining the equity basis selections of cooperative ventures that successfully form and endure. Our analysis reveals that these selections are explained by features of the cooperative environment and inequities in the derived benefits from the irrigation water.

Suggested Citation

  • Aadland, David & Koplin, Van, 2011. "Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 1-13, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:117146
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.117146
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Aadland, David & Kolpin, Van, 1998. "Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 203-218, March.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Dayton-Johnson, Jeff, 2000. "Choosing rules to govern the commons: a model with evidence from Mexico," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-41, May.
    5. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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