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A Note On The Viability Of Rainfall Insurance - Reply

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  • Bardsley, Peter

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  • Bardsley, Peter, 1986. "A Note On The Viability Of Rainfall Insurance - Reply," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 30(1), pages 1-6, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ajaeau:22880
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22880
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22880/files/30010070.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bardsley, Peter & Abey, Arun & Davenport, Scott V., 1984. "The Economics Of Insuring Crops Against Drought," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14, April.
    2. Singh, Nirvikar, 1985. "Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 599-609, June.
    3. George E. Battese & Emilio M. Francisco, 1977. "Distributions Of Indemnities For Crop‐Insurance Plans: With Application To Grain Crops In New South Wales," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 21(2), pages 67-79, August.
    4. Quiggin, John C., 1986. "A Note On The Viability Of Rainfall Insurance," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 30(1), pages 1-7, April.
    5. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, 1974. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 3, pages 54-75, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Quiggin, John C. & Karagiannis, Giannis & Stanton, J., 1993. "Crop Insurance And Crop Production: An Empirical Study Of Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 37(2), pages 1-19, August.
    2. Fraser, Rob W., 1992. "An Analysis Of Willingness-To-Pay For Crop Insurance," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 36(1), pages 1-13, April.

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