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Viewpoint And Opinion: Scope For And Limitations To Deregulation And Privatisation Of South African Agricultural Services

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  • Groenewald, J. A.

Abstract

The half century following 1930 witnessed world-wide increases in state involvement and interference in economic life. Public regulation and public enterprise brought in their wake gross inefficiency and inequity. Public enterprise could not maintain production efficiency. This, together with increasing regulation, created an ever-increasing burden of social services, monopolies, increased taxation, deficit budgeting and inflation. Governments and the public became increasingly unable to carry these burdens. This led to policies of deregulation and privatisation with improved effectiveness, efficiency and public finance as motives. Competition is vital to efficiency. Privatisation takes on different forms, depending on what is privatised and to what extent: provision or production. Persistence or formation of monopolies, changed objectives, staff and management problems and accountability present distinct pitfalls with deregulation and privatisation. These pitfalls must be overcome and avoided. Diversity and dualism in South African food needs and agricultural production imply too much needed diversity in products and market structures for a regulated environment. Deregulation and privatisation are needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Groenewald, J. A., 1991. "Viewpoint And Opinion: Scope For And Limitations To Deregulation And Privatisation Of South African Agricultural Services," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 30(2), June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:agreko:267367
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.267367
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Groenewald, Jan A., 1991. "Agricultural Trade And Marketing Policy: Future Directions," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 30(4), December.

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