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Jon Elster's Securities against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections: A Review Essay

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  • David Austen-Smith

Abstract

The standard economic approach to designing institutions for collective decision making recognizes individuals' strategically rational motivations for misrepresentation and asks how best, given an objective function, to design a set of incentives and constraints to internalize or negate such motivations. Securities Against Misrule offers, in the author's phrase, an "essay in persuasion" to the effect that such an approach is fundamentally misguided. Instead, Elster argues for a behavioral approach centered on designing institutions for good decision making, rather than good outcomes, by individuals whose actions are chronically subject to emotional, self-interested, and prejudicial distortions. ( JEL D02, D71, D72, D82)

Suggested Citation

  • David Austen-Smith, 2015. "Jon Elster's Securities against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-78, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:65-78
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.53.1.65
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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