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Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining

Author

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  • Topi Miettinen
  • Christoph Vanberg

Abstract

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Topi Miettinen & Christoph Vanberg, 2025. "Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 206-237, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:17:y:2025:i:1:p:206-37
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230208
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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