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Accounting in Partnerships

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  • Steven Huddart
  • Pierre Jinghong Liang

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Steven Huddart & Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2003. "Accounting in Partnerships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 410-414, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:410-414
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803321947434
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph Farrell & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1988. "Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 279-297.
    2. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-190, March.
    3. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    4. Steven J. Huddart & Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2002. "Profit Sharing in Partnerships," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E15, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    5. Huddart, Steven & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2005. "Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 153-187, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lennox, Clive & Wang, Chunfei & Wu, Xi, 2023. "Delegated leadership at public accounting firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).
    2. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
    3. Linus Wilson, 2012. "Financing professional partnerships," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 36(1), pages 58-92, January.
    4. Liao, Fang-nan & Zhang, Chuancai & Zhang, Jin-jin & Yan, Xiang & Chen, Tian-xiang, 2024. "Hyperbole or reality? The effect of auditors' AI education on audit report timeliness," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    5. Özgür Kıbrıs & Arzu Kıbrıs, 2016. "On surplus-sharing in partnerships," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 89-111, June.
    6. Franz Wirl, 2009. "Non-cooperative investment in partnerships and their termination," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 17(4), pages 479-494, December.
    7. Madhav V. Rajan & Stefan Reichelstein, 2006. "Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 585-618, June.
    8. Jürgen Ernstberger & Christopher Koch & Eva Maria Schreiber & Greg Trompeter, 2020. "Are Audit Firms' Compensation Policies Associated with Audit Quality?," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 218-244, March.
    9. Steven Huddart, 2013. "Discussion of Empirical Evidence on the Implicit Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 389-397, May.
    10. Ferreyra, Maria Marta & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2012. "Information asymmetry and equilibrium monitoring in education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 237-254.
    11. Beardsley, Erik L. & Imdieke, Andrew J. & Omer, Thomas C., 2021. "The distraction effect of non-audit services on audit quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    12. Daniel Aobdia, 2020. "The Economic Consequences of Audit Firms’ Quality Control System Deficiencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 2883-2905, July.
    13. Kyungha Kari Lee & Carolyn B. Levine, 2020. "Audit partner identification and audit quality," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 778-809, June.
    14. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2019. "Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5360-5370, November.
    15. Huddart, Steven & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2005. "Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 153-187, December.

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