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Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements

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  • Stanley Besen

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  • Stanley Besen, 2001. "Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 292-296, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:2:p:292-296
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.2.292
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.91.2.292
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Internet peering as a network of relations," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 33-49, February.
    2. Zhuo, Ran & Huffaker, Bradley & claffy, kc & Greenstein, Shane, 2021. "The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation on internet interconnection," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(2).
    3. Chang-Ho Yoon & Young-Woong Song & Byoung Heon Jun, 2005. "The Role of Switching Hubs in Global Internet Traffic," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(4), pages 557-574, December.
    4. Foros, Oystein & Jarle Kind, Hans & Yngve Sand, Jan, 2005. "Do internet incumbents choose low interconnection quality?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 149-164, March.
    5. Ruzana Davoyan & Jorn Altmann & Wolfgang Effelsberg, 2010. "Exploring the Effect of Traffic Differentiation on Interconnection Cost Sharing," TEMEP Discussion Papers 201042, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Jan 2010.
    6. Ruzana Davoyan & Jorn Altmann & Wolfgang Effelsberg, 2010. "Intercarrier Compensation in Unilateral and Bilateral Arrangements," TEMEP Discussion Papers 201041, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Jan 2010.
    7. Fabio M. Manenti, 2002. "Congestion, Private Peering and Capacity Investment on the Internet," Industrial Organization 0212003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Apr 2003.
    8. Pierre Coucheney & Patrick Maillé & Bruno Tuffin, 2014. "Network neutrality debate and ISP inter-relations: traffic exchange, revenue sharing, and disconnection threat," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 155-182, November.
    9. Shane Greenstein, 2006. "Innovation and the Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Access in the United States," Discussion Papers 05-018, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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