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Strategic Behavior in Contests: Reply

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  • Avinash Dixit

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Avinash Dixit, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 694-694, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:3:p:694-694
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.3.694
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.89.3.694
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007. "The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
    2. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    3. Yohan Pelosse, 2024. "Sequential Contest when the Precision of Observation is Endogenous," Working Papers 2024-02, Swansea University, School of Management.
    4. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo M. Mialon, 2012. "Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 520-538, June.
    5. Alexander Matros, 2004. "Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments," 2004 Meeting Papers 616, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Elimination Tournaments where Players Have Fixed Resources," Working Paper 205, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2006.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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