Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis
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- Martin Shubik, 1970. "Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 288, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-684, Part I Se.
- Gerard Debreu, 1963.
"On a Theorem of Scarf,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
- Gerard Debreu, 1961. "On a Theorem of Scarf," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 130, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Rudy Colacicco, 2015. "Ten Years Of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(5), pages 965-992, December.
- Martin Shubik, 1973. "The General Equilibrium Model with Joint Ownership of the Corporation (Voting Stock and the Core)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 359, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mann, Stefan & Wustemann, Henry, 2008. "Multifunctionality and a new focus on externalities," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 293-307, February.
- Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1972. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part VI. The Rate of Interest, Noncooperative Equilibrium and Bankruptcy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 334, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- M. Peiris & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2013. "Savings and default," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 153-180, September.
- Chen-Zhong Qin & Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 2009. "Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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