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Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers

Author

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  • Andrew Sweeting
  • Dun Jia
  • Shen Hui
  • Xinlu Yao

Abstract

We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Sweeting & Dun Jia & Shen Hui & Xinlu Yao, 2022. "Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1311-1333, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:4:p:1311-33
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20202016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2016. "Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding All Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 658-703.
    2. Mizuno, Toshihide, 2003. "On the existence of a unique price equilibrium for models of product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 761-793, June.
    3. David Besanko & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav Kryukov & Mark Satterthwaite, 2010. "Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 453-508, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frago Kourandi & Nikolaos Vettas, 2024. "Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure with Learning-by-Doing Production Technologies," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-23, February.
    2. Eigruber, Markus & Wirl, Franz, 2024. "Market equilibrium strategies under learning by doing and spillovers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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