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Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples

Author

Listed:
  • Thành Nguyen
  • Rakesh Vohra

Abstract

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a "nearby" instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two.

Suggested Citation

  • Thành Nguyen & Rakesh Vohra, 2018. "Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(11), pages 3154-3169, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:11:p:3154-69
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141188
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ata Atay & Sylvain Funck & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Matching markets with farsighted couples," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/445, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Bloch, Francis & Cantala, David & Gibaja, Damián, 2020. "Matching through institutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 204-231.
    3. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut & Van der Linden, Martin, 2024. "Capacity design in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 277-291.
    4. Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza & Kamali-Shahdadi, Behrang, 2023. "Matching Unskilled/Skilled Workers to Firms Facing Budget Constraints," TSE Working Papers 23-1446, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Chao Huang, 2021. "Stable matching: an integer programming approach," Papers 2103.03418, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    6. Chao Huang, 2022. "Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences," Papers 2205.05599, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    7. Thành Nguyen & Rakesh Vohra, 2019. "Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 1503-1519, November.
    8. Hai Nguyen & Thành Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym, 2021. "Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7438-7454, December.
    9. Ce Liu & Ziwei Wang & Hanzhe Zhang, 2023. "Self-Enforced Job Matching," Papers 2308.13899, arXiv.org.
    10. Chao Huang, 2021. "Unidirectional substitutes and complements," Papers 2108.12572, arXiv.org.
    11. Chao Huang, 2022. "Firm-worker hypergraphs," Papers 2211.06887, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    12. Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Stability in Weighted College Admissions Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 63, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    13. Chao Huang, 2023. "Concave many-to-one matching," Papers 2309.04181, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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