Can Admissions Percent Plans Lead to Better Collegiate Fit for Minority Students?
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Abstract
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20161115
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Cited by:
- Sandra E. Black & Kalena E. Cortes & Jane Arnold Lincove, 2020.
"Apply Yourself: Racial and Ethnic Differences in College Application,"
Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 15(2), pages 209-240, Spring.
- Sandra E. Black & Kalena E. Cortes & Jane Arnold Lincove, 2015. "Apply Yourself: Racial and Ethnic Differences in College Application," NBER Working Papers 21368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Black, Sandra E. & Cortes, Kalena E. & Lincove, Jane Arnold, 2015. "Apply Yourself: Racial and Ethnic Differences in College Application," IZA Discussion Papers 9169, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lincove, Jane Arnold & Cortes, Kalena E., 2016. "Match or Mismatch? Automatic Admissions and College Preferences of Low- and High-Income Students," IZA Discussion Papers 10150, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jane Arnold Lincove & Kalena E. Cortes, 2016. "Match or Mismatch? Automatic Admissions and College Preferences of Low- and High-Income Students," NBER Working Papers 22559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Firoozi, Daniel, 2022. "The impact of post-admission merit scholarships on enrollment decisions and degree attainment: Evidence from randomization," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
- Klasik, Daniel & Cortes, Kalena E., 2022. "Uniform admissions, unequal access: Did the top 10% plan increase access to selective flagship institutions?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
- Cortes, Kalena E. & Klasik, Daniel, 2020. "Uniform Admissions, Unequal Access: Did the Top 10% Plan Increase Access to Selective Flagship Institutions?," IZA Discussion Papers 13988, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2020. "Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-21.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
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