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Quand les salariés jugent leur salaire

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  • Olivier Godechot
  • Marc Gurgand

Abstract

[fre] Alors que la subjectivité individuelle est un dispositif essentiel de construction de la science économique et des sciences sociales en général, elle fait assez peu l’objet d’investigations quantitatives systématiques. Les conséquences d’une question en apparence anodine posée dans l’enquête Travail et modes de vie: «Compte tenu du travail que vous fournissez, diriez-vous que vous êtes: 1. Très bien payé, 2. Plutôt bien payé, 3. Normalement payé, 4. Plutôt mal payé, 5. Très mal payé?» ont été étudiées. En supposant que la satisfaction mesurée par cette question dépend de l’écart entre le salaire perçu et le salaire attendu, certains résultats de la théorie de la compensation salariale sont réexaminés: le salaire attendu (subjectivement) n’est pas le salaire espéré (au sens de l’espérance objective de salaire)! Ainsi, les hommes souhaiteraient que les pénibilités physiques soient mieux compensées, les femmes, que l’on tienne mieux compte des contraintes temporelles et moins du statut social. Une telle divergence entre l’ordre des attentes et des rémunérations est, d’une part, due à l’imperfection du marché du travail et, d’autre part, au mode de construction des attentes. Celles-ci ne sont pas seulement le résultat d’un calcul économique purement individuel, mais d’un processus de comparaison interpersonnelle mettant en jeu la famille, le milieu social, voire le marché, à partir duquel les individus se construisent une représentation de la rémunération juste et injuste. Puisque ce salaire attendu met en jeu une notion de justice, on peut se demander si la répartition des salaires attendus est plus égalitaire ou plus inégalitaire que celle des salaires perçus. Lorsqu’on modifie les salaires pour tenir compte des primes implicitement réclamées pour compenser les conditions de travail, la distribution obtenue est plus inégalitaire que celle des salaires effectivement perçus. À l’inverse, lorsqu’on ajuste les salaires en tenant compte des seules variables sociodémographiques, c’est la distribution des salaires perçus qui est la plus inégalitaire. Les salariés trouveraient donc juste que la répartition des revenus dépende moins du statut et tienne mieux compte des conditions de travail. [spa] Si bien la subjetividad individual es algo esencial en la construcción de la ciencia económica y de las ciencias sociales en general, no ha sido objeto de muchas investigaciones cuantitativas sistemáticas. Se han estudiado las consecuencias de una pregunta aparentemente anodina de la encuesta Trabajo y modos de vida: «Teniendo en cuenta la labor que usted desempeña, diría usted que está: 1. Muy bien pagado, 2. Bien pagado, 3. Pagado lo normal, 4. Más bien mal pagado, 5. Muy mal pagado.» Si se supone que la satisfacción medida por esta pregunta depende de la diferencia entre el salario cobrado y el salario esperado, se deben evaluar nuevamente ciertos resultados de la teoría de la compensación salarial: ¡ el salario esperado subjetivamente no es el salario esperado en el sentido de la esperanza objetiva de salario! . Así, los hombres desearían que las penosidades físicas se compensaran mejor, las mujeres, que se tuvieran en cuenta las dificultades de horarios y menos el estatuto social. Tal divergencia entre lo esperado y las remuneraciones se debe por parte a la imperfección del mercado laborai y por otra parte al modo de construcción de las esperas. Éstas no son sólo el resultado de un cálculo económico meramente individual, sine de un proceso de comparación interpersonal en el que intervienen la familia, el medio social, hasta el mercado, y a partir de éste los individuos elaboran una representación de la remuneración justa e injusta. . Ya que en el salario esperado interviene una noción de justicia, uno puede preguntarse si el reparte salarial esperado es más o menos igualitario que el de los salarios cobrados realmente. Cuando se cambian los salarios para tomar en cuenta sobresueldos implícitamente pedidos para compensar las condiciones laborales, la distribución obtenida es más desigualitaria que la de los salarios cobrados. A la inversa, cuando se ajustan los salarios tomando en cuenta tan sólo las variables sociodemográficas, es la distribución de los sala rios cobrados la más desigualitaria. A los asalariados les parecería más justo que el reparto de las rentas dependiera menos del estatuto y tomara en cuenta mejor las condiciones laborales. [ger] Während die individuelle Subjektivität einen wesentlichen Untersuchungsfaktor in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft und in den Sozialwissenschaften im allgemeinen darstellt, wird sie bei systematischen quantitativen Studien kaum herangezogen. Untersucht wurden die Antworten auf eine scheinbar unbedeutende Frage, die in der Erhebung . Arbeit und Lebensart gestellt wurde: «Sind Sie der Meinung, daß Sie in Anbetracht der von Ihnen geleisteten Arbeit: 1. Sehr gut bezahlt werden? 2. Eher gut bezahlt werden? 3. Normal bezahlt werden? 4. Eher schlecht bezahlt werden? 5. Sehr schlecht bezahlt werden?» Da die durch diese Frage gemessene Zufriedenheit davon abhängt, wie stark der erhaltene Lohn vom erwarteten Lohn abweicht, werden einige Ergebnisse der Theorie des Lohnausgleichs erneut einer Prüfung unterzogen: der (subjektiv) erwartete Lohn ist nicht der (im Sinne der objektiven Lohnerwartung) erhoffte Lohn! . So möchten die Männer, daß die physischen Belastungen besser ausgeglichen werden, und die Frauen, daß man die zeitlichen Zwänge stärker berücksichtigt als den sozialen Status. Eine solche Diskrepanz zwischen den Erwartungen und den Vergütungen ist einerseits auf die Unvollkommenheit des Arbeitsmarkt und andererseits auf die Art der Entstehung der Erwartungen zurückzuführen. Diese sind nicht nur das Ergebnis einer rein individuellen wirtschaftlichen Rechnung, sondern eines Prozesses des Vergleichs zwischen den Menschen, bei dem die Familie, das soziale Umfeld, ja sogar der Markt eine Rolle spielen, auf dessen Grundlage die Menschen jeweils ihre Vorstellung von der gerechten und ungerechten Entlohnung entwickeln. . Da bei diesem erwarteten Lohn der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff eine Rolle spielt, stellt sich die Frage, ob die erwarteten Löhne gleicher oder ungleicher als die erhaltenen Löhne verteilt sind. Ändert man die Löhne, um die implizit zum Ausgleich der Arbeitsbedingungen verlangten Prämien zu berücksichtigen, ist die Verteilung ungleicher als im Falle der tatsächlich bezogenen Löhne. Wenn man dagegen die Löhne anpaßt, um lediglich die sozio-demographischen Variablen zu berücksichtigen, ist die Verteilung der erhaltenen Löhne am wenigsten gleich. So wäre es nach Ansicht der Arbeitnehmer gerecht, daß die Verteilung der Löhne weniger vom Status abhängt und in stärkerem Maße den Arbeitsbedingungen Rechnung tragt. [eng] Although individual subjectivity is an essential component of economics and social sciences in general, it is rarely considered systematically and quantitatively. We study the results of an apparently innocuous question in the Work and Lifestyles survey: "Considering the work you do, would you say that you are: 1. Very well paid, 2. Well paid, 3. Paid the standard rate, 4. Poorly paid, 5. Very poorly paid?". Assuming that the satisfaction measured by this question depends on the deviation between actual wages and expected wages, certain wage compensation theory findings are re-examined: the subjectively expected wage is not the same as the objectively anticipated wage! . For example, men would like physical hardness to be better paid while women would like more allowance to be made for time constraints and less for social status. This divergence between the order of expectations and remuneration is due to an imperfect labour market and the way in which expectations are formed. Expectations do not just derive from a purely individual economic calculation. Individuals form a picture of just and unjust wages based on an interpersonal comparison process covering family, social class and even the market. . Given that this expected wage involves a notion of justice, the question could be asked as to whether the distribution of expected wages is more or less egalitarian than the distribution of paid wages. When wages are adjusted to include implicitly claimed bonuses to compensate working conditions, the distribution obtained is more inegalitarian than the distribution of wages actually paid. Conversely, when wages are adjusted to include solely socio-demographic variables, the distribution of paid wages is found to be the most inegalitarian. Employees would therefore find it just for the distribution of income to depend less on status and more on working conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Godechot & Marc Gurgand, 2000. "Quand les salariés jugent leur salaire," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 331(1), pages 3-24.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2000_num_331_1_6787
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2000.6787
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2000.6787
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nikolaos Georgantzis & Efi Vasileiou, 2014. "Are Dangerous Jobs Paid Better? European Evidence," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 163-192, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Emmanuelle Nauze-Fichet & Magda Tomasini, 2005. "Parcours des jeunes à la sortie du système éducatif et déclassement salarial," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 388(1), pages 57-83.
    3. Bertrand Lhommeau & Véronique Rémy, 2009. "Les politiques d’allégements ont-elles un effet sur la mobilité salariale des travailleurs à bas salaire ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 429(1), pages 21-49.
    4. Böckerman, Petri & Ilmakunnas, Pekka & Johansson, Edvard, 2011. "Job security and employee well-being: Evidence from matched survey and register data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 547-554, August.
    5. Clark, Andrew E. & Senik, Claudia, 2006. "The (unexpected) structure of "rents" on the French and British labour markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 180-196, April.
    6. Philippe Lemistre, 2007. "Diplômes et emplois occupés par les jeunes. Une correspondance à revoir," Post-Print halshs-00131770, HAL.
    7. Petri Böckerman & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2006. "Do job disamenities raise wages or ruin job satisfaction?," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 27(3), pages 290-302, April.
    8. Olivier Godechot & Zinaida Salibekyan, 2019. "Should We Clash or Should I Go? The Impact of Low Wage and Poor Working Conditions on the Exit‐Voice Trade‐Off," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 33(4), pages 425-449, December.
    9. Ambra Poggi, 2007. "Do Satisfactory Working Conditions Contribute to Explaining Earning Differentials in Italy? A Panel Data Approach," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 21(4‐5), pages 713-733, December.
    10. Olivier Godechot & Zinaida Salibekyan, 2019. "Should We Clash or Should I Go? The Impact of Low Wage and Poor Working Conditions on the Exit-Voice Trade-Off," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03098558, HAL.
    11. Böckerman, Petri & Ilmakunnas, Pekka & Johansson, Edvard, 2009. "Creative destruction and employee well-being," MPRA Paper 15447, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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