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Content
2000
1999
1996
1995
- 88 Evolutionary Stability in the Rubinstein Game
by Peters, R.
- 87 Why Capital Hires Labour, and Why Labour does Not Hire Capital
by Lord Desai, M & Holler, M-J
- 86 The Economics of Hunting, Game-Preservation, and Their Legal Setting
by Hasenkamp, G.
- 85 The Optimal Share of Education Labor Under factor Transformation
by Hasenkamp, G.
- 84 Elasticity of Substitution with Affinety Transformed Variables
by Hasenkamp, G.
- 81 Strike Ballots in a Model with Private Information
by Goerke, L. & Holler, M.J.
1994