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The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society

Author

Listed:
  • Holler, M.J.
  • Wickstrom, B.-A.

Abstract

Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. it is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by prominent persons.

Suggested Citation

  • Holler, M.J. & Wickstrom, B.-A., 1999. "The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre 105, University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:hambec:105
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gilles Grolleau & Alain Marciano & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2020. "The scope for the strategic use of scandals," Post-Print hal-02306906, HAL.
    2. Gilles Grolleau & Alain Marciano & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2019. "The Scope For The Strategic Use Of Scandals," Working Papers hal-02306906, HAL.
    3. Gilles Grolleau & Alain Marciano & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2020. "The Strategic Use of Scandals," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 524-542, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; CONFLICTS ; SOCIETY ; CULTURE;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J19 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Other
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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