Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions

Citations

Cited by:

1. Flavio Menezes & Paulo Monteiro, 2003. "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 85-98, August.
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   • Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 1999. "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Microeconomics 9901002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Feb 1999.
2. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
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   • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56438, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
3. Javier D. Donna & José†Antonio Espín†Sánchez, 2018. "Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 87-127, March.
   • Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper 55079, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2018. "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper 90052, University Library of Munich, Germany.
4. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2008. "Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 857, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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5. Hikmet Gunay & Xin Meng & Victor Perez, 2024. "Selling Order in a Sequential Auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1271, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
6. Coatney, Kalyn T. & Shaffer, Sherrill L. & Menkhaus, Dale J., 2012. "Auction prices, market share, and a common agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 61-73.
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7. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005. "Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 183-201, April.
8. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 89-118, February.
9. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vermeulen, Dries, 2010. "Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 139-141, December.
   • Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2006. "Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
   • Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2010. "Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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11. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2017. "Subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry: A panel quantile regression analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 113-131.
12. Veronika Grimm, 2004. "On Procurement Auctions Of Complementary Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
13. Timothy N. Cason & Karthik N. Kannan & Ralph Siebert, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 667-688, April.
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14. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
15. Emmanuel LORENZON, 2020. "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers 2020-20, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE).
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16. Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 1-27, January.
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17. Jeitschko, Thomas D., 1999. "Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-72, July.
18. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2014. "Sequential Auctions, Price Trends, and Risk Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-139/I, Tinbergen Institute.
19. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald, 2007. "Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 64-69, October.
    • Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2006. "Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
20. Xiaoshu Xu & Dan Levin & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Auctions with synergy and resale," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 397-426, May.
21. Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2010. "Signal jamming in a sequential auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 58-61, July.
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22. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2016. "Sequential Auctions with Generalized Interdependent Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-016/I, Tinbergen Institute.
23. GUNAY, Hikmet & MENG, Xin, 2017. "Which good to sell first in a sequential auction?," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-45, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
24. Saini, Viplav, 2010. "Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 303-306, September.
25. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Yan, Jianye & Yu, Jun, 2015. "Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 96-106.
26. Das Varma, Gopal, 2003. "Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 15-37, January.
27. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Repeated contests with asymmetric information [Wiederholte Wettkämpfe mit asymmetrischer Information]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-08, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
28. Wittwer, Milena, 2020. "Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 506-530.