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CEO replacement under private information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Roman Inderst & Manuel Klein, 2007. "Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 881-904, December.
  2. Tiantian Gu & Anand Venkateswaran, 2018. "Firm-supplier relations and managerial compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 621-649, October.
  3. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022. "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 9801, CESifo.
  4. Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2018. "Managerial turnover and entrenchment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 742-771, October.
  5. Dah, Mustafa A. & Jizi, Mohammad I. & Kebbe, Reem, 2020. "CEO gender and managerial entrenchment," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
  6. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
  7. Fabienne Llense, 2009. "Taxes on severance pay, corporate governance and golden handshakes," Post-Print halshs-00441911, HAL.
  8. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
  9. Eduard Alonso-Paulí & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2012. "Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 113-141, January.
  10. Inderst, Roman, 2010. "Misselling (financial) products: The limits for internal compliance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 35-37, January.
  11. Fu, Xiaolan, 2012. "How does openness affect the importance of incentives for innovation?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 512-523.
  12. Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019. "Paid to Quit," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
  13. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2015. "Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(2), pages 183-216, March.
  14. Anderson, Ronald & Guibaud, Stéphane & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, 2012. "Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 9147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Brown, Kareen & Jha, Ranjini & Pacharn, Parunchana, 2015. "Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-126.
  16. Roman Inderst, 2008. "'Irresponsible Lending' With A Better Informed Lender," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1499-1519, October.
  17. Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart & Laux, Volker, 2017. "Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 253-261.
  18. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller & Felix Münnich, 2006. "Financing a Portfolio of Projects," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(4), pages 1289-1325.
  19. Cyrus Aghamolla & Tadashi Hashimoto, 2021. "Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 437-486, May.
  20. Marco Pagano & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Corporate Fraud, Governance, and Auditing," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 109-133.
  21. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
  22. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "Severance agreements, incentives and CEO dismissal," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 440-447.
  23. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Kuhnen, Camelia M., 2013. "CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 351-372.
  24. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2012. "Nonrecourse financing and securitization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 659-693.
  25. Sudipto Dasgupta & Thomas H. Noe, 2019. "Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders? Shareholder Democracy and Its Discontents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1810-1832, April.
  26. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
  28. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
  29. Meg Adachi‐Sato, 2018. "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 275-313, February.
  30. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2010. "Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-710, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  31. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391936, HAL.
  32. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2009. "Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 276-291, August.
  33. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2008. "Bank capital structure and credit decisions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 295-314, July.
  34. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391936, HAL.
  35. Hornstein, Abigail S., 2013. "Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 41-58.
  36. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  37. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  38. Feiran Dong & Yongzhen Xie & Linjun Cao, 2019. "Board Power Hierarchy, Corporate Mission, and Green Performance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(18), pages 1-27, September.
  39. Brown, Kareen & Pacharn, Parunchana & Patterson, Evelyn, 2022. "Managerial replacement strategies and severance pay," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  40. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 2014. "How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 437-470.
  41. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  42. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2022. "Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3604-3624, May.
  43. Zehao Hu, 2014. "Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  44. Isaka, Naoto, 2017. "When are uninformed boards preferable?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA), pages 191-211.
  45. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  46. Van Wesep, Edward D. & Wang, Sean, 2014. "The prevention of excess managerial risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 579-593.
  47. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013. "CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.
  48. Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2024. "A theory of debt maturity and innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
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