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Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation?
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Cited by:
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015.
"Pessimistic information gathering,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01156552, HAL.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Post-Print halshs-01156552, HAL.
- Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011.
"Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1094-1108.
- Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer, 2010. "Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 01-04, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018.
"Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012.
"Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 442-474, September.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2011. "Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1104, CEPREMAP.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," Post-Print hal-00813153, HAL.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00813153, HAL.
- Kim, Doyoung, 2013. "Delegation of information verification," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 488-500.
- Peter-J. Jost & Frauke Lammers, 2010. "Organization of Project Evaluation and Implementation under Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 212-238, June.
- Patrick W Schmitz, 2022.
"How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Raffaele Fiocco, 2012. "Competition and regulation with product differentiation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 287-307, December.
- Blonz, Joshua, 2018. "The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," RFF Working Paper Series 18-28, Resources for the Future.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015.
"Merger efficiency and managerial incentives,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
- Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004.
"The Organization of Delegated Expertise,"
IDEI Working Papers
284, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Gromb, Denis, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," CEPR Discussion Papers 4572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013.
"Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," MPRA Paper 41966, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
- Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008.
"On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation,"
MPRA Paper
13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2009. "On The (Sub) Optimality Of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Laux, Volker, 2008. "On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 625-635, March.
- Bing Ye & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Competitive contracts with productive information gathering," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 1-17, May.
- Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2006. "Gathering Information By A Partially Informed Agent," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(04), pages 675-694.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joshua Blonz, 2019. "The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-071, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
- Martimort, David & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.