IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ucp/jpolec/v79y1971i6p1278-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Eaton, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S, 1983. "Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1489-1505, December.
  2. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-1769, December.
  3. Abe, Naohito & Gaston, Noel & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2005. "Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 371-394, August.
  4. White, Lourdes Ferreira, 1996. "Executive compensation and dividend policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-358, July.
  5. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, "undated". "Promotion, Turover and Compensation in the Executive Market," GSIA Working Papers 2008-E32, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  6. Trechter, David D. & McGregor, Murray J. & Murray-Prior, Roy B., 2003. "A Neo-Institutional Assessment of Cooperative Evolution: Comparing the Australian Wheat Board and the Fonterra Dairy Group," 2003 Annual Meeting, October 29 31801, NCERA-194 Research on Cooperatives.
  7. Zhou, Xianming, 1999. "Executive compensation and managerial incentives: A comparison between Canada and the United States1," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 277-301, September.
  8. John M. Abowd, 1989. "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?," NBER Working Papers 3149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Amanda L. Coxbill & Lee W. Sanning & Sherrill Shaffer, 2009. "Market reaction to the announcement of a male-to-female CEO turnover," CAMA Working Papers 2009-13, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  10. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 145-168, Fall.
  11. Steven W. Millsaps & Mack Ott, 1985. "Risk aversion, risk sharing, and joint bidding: a study of outer continental shelf petroleum auctions," Working Papers 1985-014, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  12. Benoît Pigé, 1996. "The CEO turnover probability: a measure of the Board's power of revocation [La probabilité de rotation des PDG: une mesure du pouvoir de révocation du conseil d'administration]," Post-Print hal-02175779, HAL.
  13. Thierry Poulain-Rehm, 2003. "Stock-options, décisions financières des dirigeants et création de valeur de l'entreprise:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(3), pages 79-116, September.
  14. Sun, Jerry & Cahan, Steven F. & Emanuel, David, 2009. "Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1507-1519, August.
  15. Stefan Winter, 1998. "Zur Eignung von Aktienoptionsplänen als Motivationsinstrument für Manager," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 50(12), pages 1120-1142, December.
  16. Mohammed Mahmud Kakanda, & Basariah Salim, & Sitraselvi Chandren,, 2017. "Do board characteristics and risk management disclosure have any effect on firm performance? Empirical evidence from Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 13(4), pages 506-521, October.
  17. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Richard P. Chaykowski & Randy A. Ehrenberg, 1986. "Merit Pay for School Superintendents?," NBER Working Papers 1954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Scott, John L. & Anderson, Randy I. & Webb, James R., 2005. "The labor-leisure choice in executive compensation plans: Does too much pay reduce REIT performance?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 151-163.
  19. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July.
  20. H Peyton Young & Lucas Merrill Brown, 2016. "The Diffusion of a Social Innovation: Executive Stock Options from 1936," Economics Series Working Papers 777, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  21. Pukthuanthong, Kuntara & Roll, Richard & Walker, Thomas, 2007. "How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 695-720, December.
  22. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
  24. Wilbur G. Lewellen, -, 1997. "Hatékonyság és eredményesség [Efficiency and effectiveness]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 3-12.
  25. Hanlon, Michelle & Rajgopal, Shivaram & Shevlin, Terry, 2003. "Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 3-43, December.
  26. Haye, Eric M., 1997. "Corporate control effects and managerial remuneration in commercial banking," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 239-252.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.