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Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment

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Cited by:

  1. Koyama, Mark, 2012. "The Law and Economics of Private Prosecutions in Industrial Revolution England," MPRA Paper 40500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Eric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2013. "Elected vs appointed public law enforcers," Working Papers 2013-06, CRESE.
  3. C. McDougall & M. Cohen & R. Swaray & A. Perry, 2008. "Benefit‐Cost Analyses of Sentencing," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 1-86.
  4. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
  5. Yahagi, Ken & Yamaguchi, Yohei, 2023. "Law enforcement with rent-seeking government under voting pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  6. Nava Ashraf & Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2016. "Infrastructure, Incentives, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 77-82, May.
  7. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 377-412.
  8. Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  9. Fuhai Hong & Dong Zhang, 2023. "Bureaucratic beliefs and law enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 357-379, September.
  10. Zhiyong (John) Liu & Zhewei Wang & Zhendong Yin, 2022. "When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 682-708, August.
  11. Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006. "Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 214-229, February.
  12. Pallage, Stephane & Demougin, Dominique, 2003. "Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 309-321, September.
  13. Ken Yahagi & Susumu Cato, 2023. "Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 237-257, June.
  14. Jordi Galí, 2015. "Insider-outsider labor markets, hysteresis and monetary policy," Economics Working Papers 1506, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2020.
  15. Dhami, Sanjit & al-Nowaihi, Ali, 2013. "An extension of the Becker proposition to non-expected utility theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 10-20.
  16. Edward L. Glaeser, 2013. "A World of Cities: The Causes and Consequences of Urbanization in Poorer Countries," NBER Working Papers 19745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. D’Antoni, Massimo & Galbiati, Roberto, 2007. "A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-218.
  18. Nuno Garoupa, 2003. "Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-15, January.
  19. Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006. "The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime," Seminar Papers 741, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  20. Isaac Ehrlich, 2010. "The Market Model of Crime: A Short Review and New Directions," Chapters, in: Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  21. Derek Pyne, 2004. "Can Making It Harder to Convict Criminals Ever Reduce Crime?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 191-201, September.
  22. Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2015. "Public law enforcers and political competition," EconomiX Working Papers 2015-40, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  23. Isztin, Péter, 2018. "Bűnök és büntetések - tanulságok a közgazdaságtani irodalomból [Crimes and punishments: Insights from economic literature]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 287-302.
  24. Bodenhorn, Howard, 2016. "Prison crowding, recidivism, and early release in early Rhode Island," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 55-74.
  25. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Eugenia Belova & Paul Gregory, 2009. "Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 463-478, September.
  27. Nejat Anbarci & Monica Escaleras & Charles Register, 2006. "Collective (In)Action and Corruption: Access to Improved Water and Sanitation," Working Papers 06003, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  28. Sophie Bienenstock & Pierre Kopp, 2023. "The extensive reach of the FCPA beyond American borders: Is a bad deal always better than a good trial?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 381-401, September.
  29. Hugh-Jones, David & Perroni, Carlo, 2017. "The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 112-130.
  30. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.
  31. M. Martin Boyer & Richard Peter, 2020. "Insurance Fraud in a Rothschild–Stiglitz World," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(1), pages 117-142, March.
  32. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2016. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 105-141.
  33. Stan Miles & Derek Pyne, 2015. "Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 229-250, August.
  34. Glen Ueng, K. L. & Yang, C. C., 2001. "Plea bargaining with the IRS: extensions and further results," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 83-98, July.
  35. Farley Grubb, 2001. "The Market Evaluation of Criminality: Evidence from the Auction of British Convict Labor in America, 1767-1775," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 295-304, March.
  36. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2006. "Hang ’em with probability zero: Why does it not work?," Discussion Papers in Economics 06/14, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  37. Derek Pyne, 2010. "When is it efficient to treat juvenile offenders more leniently than adult offenders?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 351-371, November.
  38. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Private law enforcement with competing groups," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 285-297, August.
  39. Murat C. Mungan & Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Legislating for profit and optimal Eighth‐Amendment review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1403-1416, July.
  40. Yuqing Wang & Yan Ru Pei, 2019. "The Optimal Deterrence of Crime: A Focus on the Time Preference of DWI Offenders," Papers 1909.06509, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2019.
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