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Sharecropping and Agricultural Uncertainty

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Cited by:

  1. Jean-Louis Combes & Pascale Combes Motel, 2022. "Que nous apprend la littérature récente sur la « nature et les causes de la richesse des nations » ?," Mondes en développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(3), pages 289-313.
  2. Sen, Debapriya, 2011. "A theory of sharecropping: The role of price behavior and imperfect competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 181-199.
  3. Roumasset, James, 2004. "Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-Poor Economic Growth," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(01), pages 1-20, June.
  4. Geoffrey Black, 2000. "The incentive effect in share contracts: The case of finite resources," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 6(3), pages 461-474, August.
  5. Debapriya Sen, 2005. "Sharecropping, interlinkage, and price variation," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-10, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  6. Ho, Peter, 2018. "Institutional function versus form: The evolutionary credibility of land, housing and natural resources," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 642-650.
  7. Rizov, Marian, 2005. "Human capital and the agrarian structure in transition: Micro evidence from Romania," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 119-149.
  8. James, William E. & Roumasset, James A., 1979. "Explaining Variations In Share Contracts: Land Quality, Population Pressure And Technological Change," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 23(2), pages 1-12, August.
  9. Roumasset, James A., 2006. "The Economics of Agricultural Development: What Have We Learned?," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25598, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  10. Andersson, H., 1995. "Landlords and farmers: implications of disparities in bargaining power for tenancy in agriculture," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 151-162, August.
  11. Baron, Donald, 1981. "Landownership Characteristics And Investment In Soil Conservation," Staff Reports 276723, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  12. Roumasset, James A., 1994. "Explaining Diversity In Agricultural Organization: An Agency Perspective," Bulletins 12982, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
  13. Roumasset, James A., 2024. "The Microeconomics of Agricultural Development: Risk, Institutions, and Agricultural Policy," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 21(AJAD 20th), October.
  14. Agrawal, Pradeep, 1999. "Contractual structure in agriculture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 293-325, July.
  15. Eugene Canjels & Ute Volz, 2001. "Share Contracts and Unobserved Ability," SCEPA working paper series. 2001-03, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
  16. Roumasset, James, 2008. "A new institutional approach to pro-poor agricultural development: Lessons from Asia," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-6), pages 378-388.
  17. M. A. Taslim, 1992. "A Survey of Theories of Cropshare Tenancy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 68(3), pages 254-275, September.
  18. Johan Petersson & Hans Andersson, 1996. "The Benefits Of Share Contracts: Some European Results," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 158-171, January.
  19. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772, Elsevier.
  20. Ai, Chunrong & Arcand, Jean-Louis & Éthier, François, 1998. "Inefficacité marshallienne, partage de coûts et modèles contractuels avec marchés manquants," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(3), pages 315-341, septembre.
  21. Laha, A. & Kuri, P.K, 2008. "Productivity Differences under Alternative Tenurial Contracts in Agriculture and Access to Credit: Evidence from Rural West Bengal, India," Sri Lankan Journal of Agricultural Economics, Sri Lanka Agricultural Economics Association (SAEA), vol. 10, pages 1-18.
  22. Bruce Koppel & Edmund Oasa, 1987. "Induced Innovation Theory and Asia's Green Revolution: A Case Study of an Ideology of Neutrality," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 29-67, January.
  23. Elliott, Matthew & James, Harvey Jr., 2013. "Nature Of The Farm: Revisited," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150726, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  24. Cambria Finegold & Mohamed Shehata & Olfat Anwar Habib, 2011. "Productivity, Capital Mobilization and Moral Hazard in Fisheries Share Contracts: Lake Nasser, Egypt," Journal of Social and Development Sciences, AMH International, vol. 1(5), pages 183-193.
  25. Rizov, Marian, 2002. "Agricultural Production Organization in Transition Economies and the Role of Human Capital: Evidence from Romania," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24925, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  26. Price, Renee, 1999. "Voluntry earnings disclosures in Uniform franchise offering circulars," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 391-423, December.
  27. Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.
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