IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/tpr/restat/v71y1989i1p128-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  2. Dionne, Georges, 2000. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud," Working Papers 00-4, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  3. Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1998. "The Causes and Consequences of Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance, pages 81-112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Maria del Carmen Melgar & Jose Antonio Ordaz, 2010. "The Utility Of Zero-Inflated Models In The Estimation Of The Number Of Accidents In The Automobile Insurance Industry," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 5(2), pages 181-194, December.
  5. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
  6. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
  7. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
  8. Anja Deelen, 2005. "Adverse selection in disability insurance; empirical evidence for Dutch firms," CPB Discussion Paper 46, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  9. Hyojoung Kim & Doyoung Kim & Subin Im & James W. Hardin, 2009. "Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 343-366, June.
  10. Dionne, G. & Maurice, M. & Pinquet, J. & Vanasse, C., 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 01-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  11. Sharon Tennyson, 2007. "Efficiency Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets," NFI Policy Briefs 2007-PB-03, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
  12. Georges Dionne & Jean Pinquet & Mathieu Maurice & Charles Vanasse, 2011. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 218-227, February.
  13. Daniel Kaimann, 2020. "Behind the Review Curtain: Decomposition of Online Consumer Ratings in Peer-to-Peer Markets," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(15), pages 1-17, July.
  14. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work," Working Papers 2002-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  15. GÓMEZ GARCÍA, J.Mª & PELÁEZ FERMOSO, F.J. & y GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, A., 2005. "Repercusiones del envejecimiento demográfico sobre el sistema público de pensiones en Castilla y León," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 23, pages 235-253, Abril.
  16. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056, HAL.
  17. Dionne, Georges & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 47-80, mars-juin.
  18. Nirup M. Menon & Rajiv Kohli, 2013. "Blunting Damocles' Sword: A Longitudinal Model of Healthcare IT Impact on Malpractice Insurance Premium and Quality of Patient Care," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(4), pages 918-932, December.
  19. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  20. Chun-Ting Liu & Jui-Yun Wu & Chi-Hung Chang, 2020. "Switching motivation and moral hazard: evidence from automobile physical damage insurance in Taiwan," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(2), pages 361-391, April.
  21. Jose Antonio Ordaz & Maria del Carmen Melgar & M. Kazim Khan, 2011. "An Analysis Of Spanish Accidents In Automobile Insurance: The Use Of The Probit Model And Theoretical Potential Of Other Econometric Tools," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 6(3), pages 117-134, September.
  22. Przemysław Jeziorski & Elena Krasnokutskaya & Olivia Ceccarini, 2019. "Skimming from the Bottom: Empirical Evidence of Adverse Selection When Poaching Customers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 543-566, July.
  23. Shi, Peng & Valdez, Emiliano A., 2011. "A copula approach to test asymmetric information with applications to predictive modeling," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 226-239, September.
  24. Olfa N. Ghali, 2001. "An Empirical Evaluation of the Implementation of the Bonus-Malus System in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Ratemaking," Working Papers 0135, Economic Research Forum, revised 11 2001.
  25. Sharon Tennyson, 2010. "Incentive Effects of Community Rating in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Massachusetts Automobile Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 35(1), pages 19-46, June.
  26. Vukina, Tomislav & Nestić, Danijel, 2015. "Do people drive safer when accidents are more expensive: Testing for moral hazard in experience rating schemes," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 46-58.
  27. Gouriéroux, Christian & Monfort, Alain, 1997. "Modèles de comptage semi-paramétriques," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 525-550, mars-juin.
  28. Jose Antonio Ordaz & Maria del Carmen Melgar & M. Kazim Khan, 2010. "Use and Extension of Count Data Models in the Determination of Relevant Factors for Claims in the Automobile Insurance Sector," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 119-138.
  29. Hooper, Louise, 2008. "Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 157-163, January.
  30. Ming-Jyh Wang & Chieh-Hua Wen & Lawrence W Lan, 2010. "Modelling Different Types of Bundled Automobile Insurance Choice Behaviour: The Case of Taiwan*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(2), pages 290-308, April.
  31. Anja Deelen, 2005. "Adverse selection in disability insurance; empirical evidence for Dutch firms," CPB Discussion Paper 46.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  32. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
  33. Feng Gao & Michael R. Powers & Jun Wang, 2017. "Decomposing Asymmetric Information in China's Automobile Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1269-1293, December.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.