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Implementation with evidence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 871-904, October.
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  4. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2017. "Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2666-2694, September.
  6. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
  7. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  8. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
  9. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  10. Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
  11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
  12. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
  13. Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2018. "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 203-216.
  14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2021. "Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 549-567, April.
  15. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
  16. Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 327-339, March.
  17. S Nageeb Ali & Greg Lewis & Shoshana Vasserman, 2023. "Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 538-571.
  18. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Clausen, Andrew, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  20. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  21. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 1988-088X, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  23. Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
  24. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
  25. ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  26. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
  27. Amorós, Pablo, 2016. "Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 44-57.
  28. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
  29. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  30. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
  31. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  32. Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen & Yifei Sun, 2021. "Direct Implementation with Evidence," Papers 2105.12298, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  33. Peralta, Esteban, 2019. "Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-72.
  34. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  35. Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Safe Implementation," TSE Working Papers 22-1369, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  36. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
  37. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  38. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter, 2021. "Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2021/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  39. Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining," Discussion Papers 2015-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  40. Michele Lombardi & Yoshihara Naoki, 2014. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  41. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
  42. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2018. "A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 51-53.
  43. Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
  44. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  45. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  46. Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Safe Implementation," Working Papers 1363, Barcelona School of Economics.
  47. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  48. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3709dm0u7h9t9qlfe9vrqtn8ed is not listed on IDEAS
  49. Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
  50. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  51. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  52. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
  53. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  54. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  55. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
  56. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
  57. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS
  58. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  59. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
  60. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
  61. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2019. "Double implementation without no-veto-power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 124-130.
  62. Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
  63. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
  64. Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2012. "National implementation with partially honest agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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