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Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2009. "Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2193-2208, December.
  2. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2007. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," NBER Working Papers 13235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2008. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(12), pages 1963-1979, December.
  4. Kukharskyy, Bohdan, 2016. "Relational contracts and global sourcing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 123-147.
  5. M’hand Fares, 2009. "Specific performance, separability condition and the hold-up problem," Post-Print hal-02655908, HAL.
  6. Elliott Ash & Massimo Morelli & Matia Vannoni, 2022. "More Laws, More Growth? Evidence from U.S. States," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22178, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  7. Aurélien Portuese, 2012. "Law and economics of the European multilingualism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 279-325, October.
  8. Hu, Yifan & Qiu, Larry D., 2010. "An empirical analysis of contracting by Chinese firms," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-431, September.
  9. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Li, Larry & Naughton, Tony, 2013. "The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 72-76.
  10. Dhillon, Amrita & Rigolini, Jamele, 2011. "Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 79-87.
  11. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2015. "The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-39.
  12. Wu, Steven Y., 2013. "Adapting Contract Theory to Fit Contract Farming," 2014 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 3-5, 2014, Philadelphia, PA 161894, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  13. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Fumagalli, Chiara & Polo, Michele, 2007. "Buyer power and quality improvements," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 45-61, June.
  14. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2019. "Relational Contracting in Developed Economies: Lessons From Slot Exchanges in the US Airline Industry," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 411-421, September.
  15. M'hand Fares, 2009. "Specific Performance, Separability Condition and the Hold-Up Problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2055-2062.
  16. López-Bayón, Susana & González-Díaz, Manuel, 2010. "Indefinite contract duration: Evidence from electronics subcontracting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 145-159, June.
  17. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  18. Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2019. "An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2155-2191.
  19. Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
  20. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2011. "Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness," Post-Print hal-01463000, HAL.
  21. Steven Y. Wu, 2014. "Adapting Contract Theory to Fit Contract Farming," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1241-1256.
  22. Hideshi Itoh, 2023. "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 333-354, July.
  23. Claudine Desrieux & Jean Beuve, 2011. "Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(3), pages 2030-2040.
  24. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2011. "Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01463000, HAL.
  25. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2016. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 741-767, October.
  26. Antoine Faure‐Grimaud & Eloïc Peyrache & Lucía Quesada, 2009. "The ownership of ratings," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 234-257, June.
  27. Erkal, Nisvan & Wu, Steven Y. & Roe, Brian E., 2014. "Strategic Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 8704, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  28. Contreras Oscar F. & Giorgio Zanarone, 2018. "Managing Social Comparison Costs in Organizations," Working Papers 2018-25, Banco de México.
  29. Bartolozzi, D. & Gara, M. & Marchetti, D.J. & Masciandaro, D., 2022. "Designing the anti-money laundering supervisor: The governance of the financial intelligence units," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1093-1109.
  30. Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser, 2017. "Relational Contracts, the Cost of Enforcing Formal Contracts, and Capital Structure Choice - Theory and Evidence," Economics working papers 2017-11, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  31. Juan‐José Ganuza & Fernando Gomez, 2022. "Designing relational sanctions in buyer–supplier relationships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 470-491, April.
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