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Naive audience and communication bias

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Michèle Belot & Jeroen Ven, 2017. "How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(1), pages 19-43, March.
  2. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
  3. Gabriele Foà & Leonardo Gambacorta & Luigi Guiso & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2019. "The Supply Side of Household Finance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(10), pages 3762-3798.
  4. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
  5. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962239, HAL.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
  7. Sutan, Angela & Vranceanu, Radu, 2016. "Lying about delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 29-40.
  8. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  9. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
  10. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
  11. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  12. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 384, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2012.
  13. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
  14. Guiso, Luigi & Pozzi, Andrea & Tsoy, Anton & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2022. "The cost of steering in financial markets: Evidence from the mortgage market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1209-1226.
  15. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  16. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
  17. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers vie2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  18. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
  19. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
  20. Federico Vaccari, 2023. "Influential news and policy-making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1363-1418, November.
  21. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms and the Role of Consumer Protection," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(3), pages 1002-1026.
  22. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
  23. Alistair Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 461, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2012.
  24. Patrick Hummel & John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2013. "A model of flops," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 585-609, December.
  25. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
  26. Ascensión Andina‐Díaz, 2012. "Screening and Signaling in Communication," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 480-499, June.
  27. Sanjiv Erat & Uri Gneezy, 2012. "White Lies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(4), pages 723-733, April.
  28. Little, Andrew T., 2017. "Propaganda and credulity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 224-232.
  29. Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023. "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 254-280.
  30. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
  31. Tobias Gesche, 2016. "De-biasing strategic communication," ECON - Working Papers 216, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2021.
  32. Federico Vaccari, 2022. "Efficient Communication in Organizations," Working Papers 2022.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  33. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers 2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  34. Benjamin Young, 2022. "Misperception and Cognition in Markets," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-15, October.
  35. Vaccari, Federico, 2021. "Competition in Signaling," MPRA Paper 106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Dilmé, Francesc, 2022. "Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 1-19.
  37. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
  38. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints," AMSE Working Papers 1856, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
  39. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2012. "Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation," Working Papers 2012/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  40. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
  41. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
  42. Hernán, Roberto, 2012. "Information asymmetry and deception in the investment game," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1227, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  43. Gesche, Tobias, 2021. "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 452-464.
  44. Venkatesh, Raghul S, 2017. "Cheap Talk with Strategic Substitutability," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 31, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  45. Inderst, Roman, 2015. "Regulating commissions in markets with advice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 137-141.
  46. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
  47. Irma Clots-Figueras & Roberto Hernán González & Praveen Kujal, 2012. "Asymmetry and Deception in the Investment Game," Working Papers 12-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  48. Herrera, Helios & Glazer, Jacob & Perry, Motty, 2018. "Fake Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 13244, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  49. Leonardo Gambacorta & Luigi Guiso & Paolo Mistrulli & Andrea Pozzi & Anton Tsoy, 2017. "The Cost of Distorted Financial Advice - Evidence from the Mortgage Market," EIEF Working Papers Series 1713, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Oct 2017.
  50. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  51. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2022. "Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics: The role of naïve voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 78-106, January.
  52. Denter, Philipp & Ginzburg, Boris, 2021. "Troll Farms and Voter Disinformation," MPRA Paper 109634, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  53. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 401, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2012.
  54. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
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