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The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments

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Cited by:

  1. Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2015. "Investment and Competitive Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(3), pages 835-896, May.
  2. Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2018. "The Implementation Duality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1283-1324, July.
  3. Askoura, Y., 2011. "The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 43-47, January.
  4. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "An Explicit Bound on E For Nonemptimess of E-Cores of Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 537, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Youcef Askoura, 2019. "On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players : a correction," Papers 1903.09819, arXiv.org.
  6. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
  7. Thomas Gall, 2010. "Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, And The Size Distribution Of Business Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 335-364, May.
  8. Askoura, Y., 2017. "On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 32-42.
  9. Allouch, Nizar & Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna, 2009. "Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: Existence and characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 492-510, September.
  10. Kovalenkov, A. & Holtz Wooders, M., 1997. "Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 392.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  11. Andrea Canidio, 2019. "The Allocation of Scientific Talent," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1647-1672, October.
  12. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 888-906, July.
  13. Nizar Allouch & Myrna Wooders, 2017. "On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(1), pages 191-209, January.
  14. Andrea, Canidio, 2009. "The production of science," MPRA Paper 25218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Thomas Gall & Roland Amann, 2006. "How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups," Working Papers 2006.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  16. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
  17. John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 1998. "Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 952-974, November.
  18. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case," Chapters, in: Carlo Carraro (ed.), The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  19. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 2001. "An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(4), pages 654-678, November.
  20. Andrea, Canidio, 2010. "Absorptive capacity, the allocation of scientists, and firms' research productivity," MPRA Paper 30257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on," Working Papers mwooders-98-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  22. Hideo Konishi & Dimitar Simeonov, 2023. "Nonemptiness of the f-Core Without Comprehensiveness," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1062, Boston College Department of Economics.
  23. John P. Conley & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1998. "The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibrium," Working Papers mwooders-98-06, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  24. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1999. "An explicit bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of Epsilon-cores of games," Working Papers mwooders-00-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  25. Hatfield, John William & Plott, Charles R. & Tanaka, Tomomi, 2016. "Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 134-163.
  26. Yang, Zhe, 2018. "Some generalizations of Kajii’s theorem to games with infinitely many players," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 131-135.
  27. Xinyang Wang, 2020. "Cooperation in Small Groups -- an Optimal Transport Approach," Papers 2005.11244, arXiv.org.
  28. Youcef Askoura, 2011. "The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players," Post-Print hal-01982380, HAL.
  29. Newman, Andrew, 2002. "Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World," CEPR Discussion Papers 3469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Nizar Allouch & John P. Conley & Myrna Wooders, 2006. "Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with Unbounded Club Sizes," Working Papers 556, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  31. Sai, Seiken, 2014. "The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 42-49.
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