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Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Romans Pancs, 2015. "Efficient dark markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 605-624, August.
  2. Ganuza, Juan-José & Penalva, Jose, 2019. "Information disclosure in optimal auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 460-479.
  3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
  4. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning," Working Papers 479, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  5. Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2018. "Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 781-817, May.
  6. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2020. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4958-4979, November.
  7. Rieck, Thomas, 2010. "Signaling in First-Price Auctions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 18/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  8. McClellan, Andrew, 2023. "Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 173-180.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2318, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. De Liu & Adib Bagh, 2020. "Preserving Bidder Privacy in Assignment Auctions: Design and Measurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 3162-3182, July.
  11. Miller, Klaus M. & Skiera, Bernd, 2024. "Economic consequences of online tracking restrictions: Evidence from cookies," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 241-264.
  12. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers 2412.12676, arXiv.org.
  13. Ming Hu & Zizhuo Wang & Yinbo Feng, 2020. "Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 1162-1177, July.
  14. Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2009. "Dynamics in Non-Binding Procurement Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2009-06, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  15. Bo Cowgill & Cosmina Dorobantu, 2018. "Competition and Specificity in Market Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Advertising," Working Papers 18-09, NET Institute, revised Sep 2018.
  16. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2013. "Competing through information provision," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 438-451.
  17. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2021. "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 16402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. LI Daniel Zhiyun, 2012. "Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
  19. Daniel Z. Li, 2013. "Revealing Product Information to Bidders with Differentiated Preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2235-2244.
  20. Zhou, Jidong, 2021. "Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  21. Sogo, Takeharu, 2017. "Effects of seller’s information disclosure in equity auctions requiring post-auction investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 166-181.
  22. Martimort, David & Arve, Malin, 2023. "Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints," TSE Working Papers 23-1469, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2024.
  23. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  24. Agostino Manduchi, 2013. "Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 1-25, May.
  25. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2005. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 158, Barcelona School of Economics.
  26. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 857-897, December.
  27. Wang, Hai & Ye, Shuai & Chen, Hui & Yin, Junya, 2023. "The impact of carbon emission trading policy on overcapacity of companies: Evidence from China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
  28. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
    • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
  29. Stephan Lauermann & Gábor Virág, 2012. "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 107-130, November.
  30. Leonardo Rezende, 2018. "Mid-auction information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 751-780, May.
  31. George Deltas, 2009. "Introduction to the Symposium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 1-7, January.
  32. Arefeva, Alina & Meng, Delong, 2021. "Revealing information in auctions: The optimal auction versus the second-price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  33. Abraham, Ittai & Athey, Susan & Babaioff, Moshe & Grubb, Michael D., 2020. "Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 454-477.
  34. Jidong Zhou, 2017. "Competitive Bundling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 145-172, January.
  35. Alexandre de Corniere & Romain De Nijs, 2013. "Online Advertising and Privacy," Economics Series Working Papers 650, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  36. Wataru Tamura, 2016. "Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 201-225, June.
  37. Rene Laub & Klaus M. Miller & Bernd Skiera, 2023. "The Economic Value of User Tracking for Publishers," Papers 2303.10906, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
  38. Daniel Z. Li, 2016. "Disclosure or not, When There are Three Bidders?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 349-354.
  39. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2012. "Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design," Working Papers 12-11, NET Institute.
  40. Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2285, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  41. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  42. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.
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