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Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  3. James G. Mulligan & Daniel J. Wedzielewski, 2012. "Government Intervention to Prevent Bankruptcy: the Effect of Blind-Bidding Laws on Movie Theaters," Working Papers 12-03, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
  4. King, Ronald R. & Wallin, David E., 1995. "Experimental tests of disclosure with an opponent," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 139-167, February.
  5. Ackert, Lucy F. & Church, Bryan K. & Sankar, Mandira Roy, 2000. "Voluntary disclosure under imperfect competition: experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 81-105, January.
  6. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "Voluntary disclosure of information and cooperation in simultaneous-move economic interactions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 234-246.
  7. Isabelle Brocas & Juan Carrillo & Thomas Palfrey, 2012. "Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 649-676, November.
  8. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2021. "Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 141-173, May.
  9. Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2015. "Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 43-59.
  10. Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "Cursed Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1623-1672, September.
  11. Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2009. "The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 151-181, February.
  12. Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020. "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 329-367.
  13. Nichole Szembrot, 2018. "Experimental study of cursed equilibrium in a signaling game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(2), pages 257-291, June.
  14. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2022. "Rules and Commitment in Communication: An Experimental Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2283-2318, September.
  15. Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
  16. Tom Lane & Minghai Zhou, 2022. "Failure of unravelling theory? A natural field experiment on voluntary quality disclosure," Discussion Papers 2022-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  17. Volker Benndorf, 2018. "Voluntary Disclosure of Private Information and Unraveling in the Market for Lemons: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-17, May.
  18. David Porter & Roumen Vragov, 2006. "An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 445-458.
  19. Burkhard Schipper & Ying Xue Li, 2018. "Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment," Working Papers 181, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  20. Cornago, Elisabetta & Dressler, Luisa, 2020. "Incentives to (not) disclose energy performance information in the housing market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
  21. Ronald R. King & David E. Wallin, 1990. "The effects of antifraud rules and ex post verifiability on managerial disclosures," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 859-892, March.
  22. Du, Ninghua & Shahriar, Quazi, 2024. "Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 284-299.
  23. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  24. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
  25. Theodore L. Turocy & Timothy N. Cason, 2015. "Bidding in first-price and second-price interdependent-values auctions: A laboratory experiment," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-23, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  26. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2013-040 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Golman, Russell, 2023. "Acceptable discourse: Social norms of beliefs and opinions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  28. Vollstaedt, Ulrike & Imcke, Patrick & Brendel, Franziska & Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane, 2020. "Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism," Ruhr Economic Papers 887, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
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