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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

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Cited by:

  1. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2016. "Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 235-273, June.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
  3. Chen, Junlin & Jiang, Zewu & Zhao, Xiaobo & Zhu, Wanshan & Xie, Jinxing, 2024. "Supply chain contracting with asymmetric cost information and behavioral preferences: Theory and experiment," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  4. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
  5. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
  6. Petra Nieken & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2023. "Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 989-1021, November.
  7. Erlei Mathias & Schenk-Mathes Heike, 2017. "Bounded Rationality in Principal-Agent Relationships," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 411-443, December.
  8. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
  9. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
  10. Chunlin Wang & Joyendu Bhadury, 2022. "Consensus Game: An Extension of Battle of the Sexes Game," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 24(04), pages 1-15, December.
  11. Giovanni Ponti & Marcello Sartarelli & Iryna Sikora & Zhukova Vita, 2018. "Gaining Experience as Principal or Agent. An Experimental Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Ola Andersson & Håkan J. Holm & Jean-Robert Tyran & Erik Wengström, 2016. "Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(1), pages 29-36, January.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 100-112.
  14. Meickmann, Felix C., 2023. "Cooperation in knowledge sharing and R&D investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 146-164.
  15. Sophie Cêtre & Max Lobeck, 2023. "Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 646-672, July.
  16. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Chiara Nardi & Ivan Soraperra, 2014. "An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  17. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
  18. Alice Peng‐Ju Su, 2017. "Information Acquisition and the Equilibrium Incentive Problem," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 231-256, February.
  19. Xianyi Wang & Xiaofang Wang & Hui He, 2021. "Contracts to Coordinate Healthcare Providers in the Telemedicine Referral System," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(18), pages 1-25, September.
  20. Jiang, Zewu & Zhu, Wanshan & Zhang, Yang & Zhao, Xiaobo & Xie, Jinxing, 2024. "Value of screening in procurement mechanism: An experimental study," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1031-1053.
  21. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Flannery, Timothy & Roberts, Stephen, 2018. "The use of non-monotonic contracts in a single period game: An experimental investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 177-185.
  23. Werner Güth & Francesca Marazzi & Luca Panaccione, 2024. "Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(2-3), pages 381-403, March.
  24. Neilson, William & Price, Michael & Wichmann, Bruno, 2018. "Added surplus and lost bargaining power in long-term contracting," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 7-22.
  25. March, Christoph, 2021. "Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
  26. Daniel L. Chen, 2015. "Can markets stimulate rights? On the alienability of legal claims," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 23-65, March.
  27. Christian Lukas, 2018. "Monotone vs. non-monotone incentive structures: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 16(1), pages 12-34.
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