IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ids/ijecbr/v16y2018i1p12-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monotone vs. non-monotone incentive structures: an experimental analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Lukas

Abstract

This paper reports results from an experiment studying contract choice and effort provision under different contracts in a long-term agency relationship. Principals can choose between a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract N and a monotone contract M. Agents in general provide more effort under M than under N. Information about incentive compatibility further increases effort provision under contract M but not under contract N. However, principals who constantly select contract N realise the highest payoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Lukas, 2018. "Monotone vs. non-monotone incentive structures: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 16(1), pages 12-34.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:ijecbr:v:16:y:2018:i:1:p:12-34
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=93370
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Charness & Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel, 2004. "How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(2), pages 189-205, June.
    2. Macpherson, David A. & Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2014. "Deferred compensation vs. efficiency wages: An experimental test of effort provision and self-selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 90-107.
    3. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
    4. Steffen Huck & Andrew J. Seltzer & Brian Wallace, 2011. "Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 819-843, April.
    5. Vernon L. Smith, 1994. "Economics in the Laboratory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 113-131, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2015. "The German Labor Market for Older Workers in Comparative Perspective," Research Papers in Economics 2015-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    3. John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2016. "The hiring and employment of older workers in Germany: a comparative perspective [Die Beschäftigung und Neueinstellung älterer Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland: Eine vergleichende Perspektive]," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 49(4), pages 349-366, December.
    4. Fortuna Casoria & Arno Riedl, 2013. "Experimental Labor Markets And Policy Considerations: Incomplete Contracts And Macroeconomic Aspects," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 398-420, July.
    5. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
    6. Sheedy, Elizabeth & Zhang, Le & Liao, Yin, 2023. "Deferred pay: Compliance and productivity with self-selection," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    7. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
    8. Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe, 2016. "The hiring and employment of older workers in Germany : a comparative perspective (Die Beschäftigung und Neueinstellung älterer Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland : eine vergleichende Perspektive)," Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 49(4), pages 349-366.
    9. Fortuna Casoria & Arno Riedl, 2013. "Experimental Labor Markets And Policy Considerations: Incomplete Contracts And Macroeconomic Aspects," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 398-420, July.
    10. Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe, 2016. "The hiring and employment of older workers in Germany : a comparative perspective (Die Beschäftigung und Neueinstellung älterer Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland : eine vergleichende Perspektive)," Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 49(4), pages 349-366.
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    12. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
    13. Krawczyk, Michał & Tyrowicz, Joanna & Kukla-Gryz, Anna & Hardy, Wojciech, 2015. "“Piracy is not theft!” Is it just students who think so?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 32-39.
    14. Wu, Qin & Bayer, Ralph-C & Lenten, Liam J.A., 2020. "Conditional Pension Funds to Combat Cheating in Sporting Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    15. Gary Charness & Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Juan A. Lacomba & Francisco Lagos & Jose Maria Perez, 2016. "Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 433-459, June.
    16. Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2013. "An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 597-607, December.
    17. Simon G�chter & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Fairness in the Labour Market � A Survey of Experimental Results," IEW - Working Papers 114, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    18. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2013. "Claims and confounds in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 186-195.
    19. Dwenger, Nadja & Lohse, Tim, 2019. "Do individuals successfully cover up their lies? Evidence from a compliance experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-87.
    20. Gächter, Simon & Thöni, Christian, 2010. "Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 531-543, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijecbr:v:16:y:2018:i:1:p:12-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sarah Parker (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=310 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.