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Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Li, Yunan, 2019. "Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 279-328.
  2. Hobler, Stephan, 2022. "Multi-layered rational inattention and time-varying volatility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
  3. Kondor, Péter & Zawadowski, Adam, 2019. "Learning in crowded markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  4. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2018. "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2477-2512, September.
  5. Kim, Duk Gyoo & Yoon, Yeochang, 2019. "A theory of FAQs: Public announcements with rational ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 560-574.
  6. Angeletos, George-Marios & Iovino, Luigi & La'O, Jennifer, 2020. "Learning over the business cycle: Policy implications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  7. Toni Ahnert & Ali Kakhbod, 2017. "Information Choice and Amplification of Financial Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2130-2178.
  8. Ui, Takashi, 2014. "The social value of public information with convex costs of information acquisition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 249-252.
  9. Camille Cornand & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2020. "The social value of information and the competition motive: price versus quantity games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(4), pages 1101-1137, November.
  10. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2019. "Information acquisition and use by networked players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 360-401.
  11. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Observing and Shaping the Market: The Dilemma of Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(8), pages 1973-2005, December.
  12. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
  13. Baeriswyl, Romain & Boun My, Kene & Cornand, Camille, 2021. "Double overreaction in beauty contests with information acquisition: Theory and experiment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 432-445.
  14. Rondina, Giacomo & Shim, Myungkyu, 2015. "Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 769-786.
  15. Camille Cornand & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2015. "Playing the game the others want to play: Keynes’ beauty contest revisited," Working Papers of BETA 2015-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  16. Cornand, Camille & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2020. "Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 101-111.
  17. Arato, Hiroki & Hori, Takeo & Nakamura, Tomoya, 2021. "Endogenous information acquisition and the partial announcement policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
  18. Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  19. Boun My, Kene & Cornand, Camille & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2021. "Public information and the concern for coordination," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  20. George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach," NBER Working Papers 15883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Michael J. Fishman & Jonathan A. Parker, 2015. "Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(9), pages 2575-2607.
  22. Garcia, Daniel, 2012. "Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks," MPRA Paper 55481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2014.
  23. Hossain, Tanjim & Okui, Ryo, 2024. "Belief formation under signal correlation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 160-183.
  24. Feiqiong Chen & Qiaoshuang Meng & Fei Li, 2017. "How resource information backgrounds trigger post-merger integration and technology innovation? A dynamic analysis of resource similarity and complementarity," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 167-198, June.
  25. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2012. "Heterogeneous information quality; strategic complementarities and optimal policy design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 342-352.
  26. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2014. "Central bank communication design in a Lucas-Phelps economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 64-79.
  27. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
  28. Camille Cornand & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2017. "The social value of information and the competition motive: Price vs. quantity games," Working Papers halshs-01614815, HAL.
  29. Gerry Tsoukalas & Brett Hemenway Falk, 2020. "Token-Weighted Crowdsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 3843-3859, September.
  30. Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2015. "Information acquisition in global games of regime change," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 387-428.
  31. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  32. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Leister, C. Matthew, 2020. "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 453-475.
  34. Veldkamp, Laura & Farboodi, Maryam, 2018. "Long Run Growth of Financial Data Technology," CEPR Discussion Papers 13278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  35. Hiroki Arato & Tomoya Nakamura, 2013. "Endogenous Alleviation of Overreaction Problem by Aggregate Information Announcement," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 319-336, September.
  36. Emanuele Brancati & Marco Macchiavelli, 2015. "The Role of Dispersed Information in Pricing Default: Evidence from the Great Recession," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-79, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  37. Kyriazis, Nicholas & Metaxas, Theodore, 2013. "The emergence of democracy: a behavioural perspective," MPRA Paper 47146, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. de Martí, Joan & Milán, Pau, 2019. "Regime change in large information networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 262-284.
  39. Ui, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2014. "The Social Value of Public Information with Convex Costs of Information Acquisition," Discussion Papers 2014-05, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  40. Margaret Meyer & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering," Discussion Papers 1563, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  41. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
  42. Margaret Meyer & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "Beyond Correlation: Measuring Interdependence Through Complementarities," Economics Series Working Papers 655, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  43. Rigos, Alexandros, 2022. "The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  44. Kuusela, Olli-Pekka & Laiho, Tuomas, 2020. "The role of research in common pool problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  45. Florian Gauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2020. "Cognitive Empathy In Conflict Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1659-1678, November.
  46. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
  47. Shiyang Huang & Yan Xiong & Liyan Yang, 2022. "Skill Acquisition and Data Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6116-6144, August.
  48. Lou, Youcheng & Parsa, Sahar & Ray, Debraj & Li, Duan & Wang, Shouyang, 2019. "Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 594-624.
  49. Banerjee, Sanjay & Qu, Hong & Zhao, Ran, 2022. "Clarity trumps content: An experiment on information acquisition in beauty contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 381-407.
  50. Stephanie L. Chan, 2021. "The Social Value of Public Information When Not Everyone is Privately Informed," Working Papers 2021-09-18, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  51. Camille Cornand & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2021. "Central bank’s stabilization and communication policies when firms have motivated overconfidence in their own information accuracy or processing," Working Papers 2118, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  52. Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.
  53. Maryam Farboodi & Laura Veldkamp, 2018. "Long Run Growth of Financial Data Technology," Working Papers 18-09, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  54. Tatsushi Okuda & Tomohiro Tsuruga, 2021. "Inflation Expectations and Central Bank Communication with Unknown Prior," IMES Discussion Paper Series 21-E-07, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  55. Chen, Heng & Luo, Yulei & Pei, Guangyu, 2015. "Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 37-57.
  56. repec:dpr:wpaper:0908 is not listed on IDEAS
  57. Bernard Herskovic & João Ramos, 2020. "Acquiring Information through Peers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2128-2152, July.
  58. Ryan Chahrour, 2014. "Public Communication and Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 73-101, July.
  59. Galperti, Simone & Trevino, Isabel, 2020. "Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  60. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition," Papers 2204.09250, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  61. Gianluca Femminis & Giulio Piccirilli, 2020. "Public information, education and welfare," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 37(1), pages 137-166, April.
  62. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Papers 2203.16809, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  63. Denti, Tommaso, 2023. "Unrestricted information acquisition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  64. Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall," Discussion Papers 1576, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  65. Han, Jungsuk & Sangiorgi, Francesco, 2018. "Searching for information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 342-373.
  66. Myungkyu Shim & Giacomo Rondina, 2014. "Precision of Market-Generated Information in Economies with Coordination Motives," 2014 Meeting Papers 554, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  67. Iachan, Felipe S. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2015. "Information quality and crises in regime-change games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 739-768.
  68. Cheremukhin, Anton & Tutino, Antonella, 2016. "Information rigidities and asymmetric business cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 142-158.
  69. Chen, Heng & Luo, Yulei & Pei, Guangyu, 2014. "Too Much of a Good Thing: Attention Misallocation and Social Welfare in Coordination Games," MPRA Paper 59139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  70. repec:grz:wpaper:2016-02 is not listed on IDEAS
  71. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 455-485, May.
  72. Annie Liang & Xiaosheng Mu & Vasilis Syrgkanis, 2019. "Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2019-25, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  73. Benjamin Davies, 2024. "Learning about a changing state," Papers 2401.03607, arXiv.org.
  74. Aghamolla, Cyrus & Smith, Kevin, 2023. "Strategic complexity in disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2).
  75. Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020. "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
  76. Daniel Susskind, 2022. "Rational inattention and public signals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 225-255, February.
  77. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 039, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  78. Torun Dewan & David P Myatt, 2012. "On the rhetorical strategies of leaders: Speaking clearly, standing back, and stepping down," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 431-460, October.
  79. Grout, Paul A. & Mitraille, Sébastien & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2015. "The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 517-535.
  80. Yang, Ming, 2015. "Coordination with flexible information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 721-738.
  81. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto, 2019. "When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 52-64.
  82. repec:hal:journl:hal-04808798 is not listed on IDEAS
  83. Guido Lorenzoni & George-Marios Angeletos, 2010. "Price Making Intermediation," 2010 Meeting Papers 963, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  84. Eccles, Peter & Wegner, Nora, 2017. "Scalable games: modelling games of incomplete information," Bank of England working papers 641, Bank of England.
  85. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2012. "Anticipating Future Expected Utility and Coordination Motives for Information Decisions in Networks," Working Papers DTE 536, CIDE, División de Economía.
  86. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2015. "Cournot competition and the social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 466-506.
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