IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/oup/restud/v79y2012i3p1151-1174.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Incentives for Unaware Agents

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. “Incentives for Unaware Agents,” E.L. von Thadden & X. Zhao (2012)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2013-04-12 01:29:52

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Wenjun Ma & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2017. "Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 245-257, August.
  2. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  3. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Working Papers 365, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2020. "Limited Awareness and Financial Intermediation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 043, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  5. Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
  6. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  7. Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019. "Paid to Quit," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
  8. Feinberg, Yossi, 2012. "Games with Unawareness," Research Papers 2122, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  9. Zhongwen Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2023. "Strategic Information Suppression in Borrowing and Pre-Lending Cognition: Theory and Evidence," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-24, May.
  10. Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  11. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Conditional dominance in games with unawareness," Working Papers 351, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  12. Nicola Pavoni & Sarah Auster, 2016. "Optimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediation," 2016 Meeting Papers 1106, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Li, Sanxi & Peitz, Martin & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2016. "Information disclosure and consumer awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 209-230.
  14. Gui, Zhengqing & Huang, Yangguang & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2024. "Financial fraud and investor awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 104-123.
  15. Zhao, Xiaojian, 2011. "Framing contingencies in contracts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 31-40, January.
  16. Zhengqing Gui & Yangguang Huang & Xiaojian Zhao, 2018. "Whom to Educate? Financial Fraud and Investor Awareness," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2018-52, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Jan 2018.
  17. Surajeet Chakravarty & David Kelsey & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2018. "Tort Liability and Unawareness," Discussion Papers 1801, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  18. Wenjun Ma & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2017. "Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 245-257, August.
  19. Ernst-Ludwig Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2014. "Multi-task agency with unawareness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 197-222, August.
  20. Katarina Kostelic, 2020. "Guessing the Game: An Individual’s Awareness and Assessment of a Game’s Existence," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-28, March.
  21. Jan Starmans, 2023. "Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 3003-3024, May.
  22. Auster, Sarah, 2013. "Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 503-521.
  23. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2024. "Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions," Papers 2412.12676, arXiv.org.
  24. Sarah Auster, 2012. "Asymmetric Awareness and Moral Hazard," Economics Working Papers ECO2012/23, European University Institute.
  25. Ying-Ju Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2013. "Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-24, August.
  26. Canidio, Andrea & Karle, Heiko, 2022. "The focusing effect in negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 1-20.
  27. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2018. "Optimal Delegation and Limited Awareness, with an Application to Financial Intermediation," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1869, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  28. Spyros Galanis, 2011. "Syntactic foundations for unawareness of theorems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 593-614, October.
  29. Brisker, Eric & Wang, Jinjing & Wang, Shuai, 2024. "Why do life insurers hold sin bonds? Evidence from investment delegation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  30. Gaia Belardinelli & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2023. "Implicit Knowledge in Unawareness Structures," Working Papers 360, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  31. Surajeet Chakravarty & David Kelsey & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2020. "Operationalizing Reverse Bayesianism," Discussion Papers 2020-18, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  32. Matteo Foschi, 2016. "Contracting with Type-Dependent Naïveté," Discussion Papers in Economics 16/03, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.